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1673 
RESTORING REASONABLENESS TO WORKPLACE 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS 
Dallan F. Flake* 
Abstract: When Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1972 to require 
employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious practices absent undue hardship 
to their business, it intended to protect employees from being forced to choose between their 
jobs and their religious beliefs. Yet in the decades since, courts have cut away at this right to 
the point it is practically nonexistent. Particularly concerning is the growing tendency of courts 
to read reasonableness out of the accommodation requirement, either by conflating 
reasonableness and undue hardship so that an accommodation’s reasonableness depends solely 
on whether it would cause the employer undue hardship, by setting the bar for reasonableness 
so low it is practically meaningless, or by ignoring the requirement altogether. Consequently, 
employers today have near carte blanche over whether and how to provide religious 
accommodations—a power imbalance that often forces employees into the precise dilemma 
from which Congress sought to protect them. 
This Article argues for the restoration of employees’ right to reasonable religious 
accommodations. It does so by asserting that reasonableness under Title VII is a standalone 
requirement, separate and distinct from undue hardship, that must be evaluated from the 
employee’s perspective. An accommodation should be deemed reasonable to the employee 
only if it (1) fully eliminates the conflict between the employee’s job and religion, (2) does not 
cause the employee to suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) avoids unnecessarily 
disadvantaging the employee’s terms or conditions of employment. This conceptualization of 
reasonableness aligns with Congress’s intent and, if adopted, would help level the playing field 
between employers and employees in this increasingly critical area of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Jerome Christmon asked B&B Airparts to accommodate his 
Hebrew Israelite faith by allowing him to work his mandatory overtime 
shifts on Sundays instead of Saturdays, his employer refused.1 With no 
other option, Christmon stopped showing up for his Saturday shifts so he 
could observe his Sabbath.2 Although B&B refrained from firing him for 
his absences, Christmon felt deeply dissatisfied with this arrangement 
because it caused him to miss out on lucrative overtime pay.3 He 
eventually filed suit, alleging B&B violated Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which requires an employer to “reasonably accommodate to 
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or 
practice” unless doing so would cause “undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer’s business.”4 
Christmon did not fare well in litigation. The district court granted 
B&B summary judgment, which the Tenth Circuit affirmed.5 That B&B 
won and Christmon lost is hardly surprising: employee victories in 
religious accommodation cases tend to be few and far between.6 
 
1. Christmon v. B&B Airparts, Inc., 735 F. App’x 510, 512 (10th Cir. 2018). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).  
5. Christmon, 735 F. App’x at 515. 
6. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 929 (2003) (explaining why it 
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Nevertheless, the case is alarming because of how the court reached its 
decision. The appellate court held that B&B’s accommodation—
refraining from firing Chrismon for his Saturday absences—was 
reasonable because it allowed him to keep his job, no matter how it 
otherwise impacted his employment.7 The court’s opinion is devoid of any 
analysis of how much overtime pay Christmon was unable to earn, 
whether his Saturday absences or inability to work overtime hindered his 
opportunities for promotion, or whether the accommodation adversely 
impacted some other term or condition of his employment. The court 
instead emphasized that “a reasonable accommodation does not 
necessarily spare an employee from any resulting cost” and that an 
“accommodation may be reasonable even though it is not the one that the 
employee prefers.”8 In essence, the court told Christmon to quit 
complaining—he was lucky to have kept his job. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision is symptomatic of a 
disconcerting trend whereby courts assess a religious accommodation’s 
validity without duly considering how it impacts the employee’s terms or 
conditions of employment. Despite Title VII’s plain language requiring 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations,9 courts are effectively 
reading this requirement out of the statute by (1) conflating 
reasonableness and undue hardship so that an accommodation’s 
reasonableness depends solely on whether it causes the employer undue 
hardship, (2) setting the bar for reasonableness so low it is practically 
meaningless, or (3) ignoring the requirement altogether. 
This trend is made more egregious by the fact it is part of a longstanding 
judicial crusade to dilute Title VII’s religious accommodation provision. 
More than four decades ago, the Supreme Court gutted the statute by 
construing “undue hardship” to mean anything more than a de minimis 
burden to the employer10—essentially giving employers the green light to 
 
is easier for an employer to defeat a religious accommodation claim than a disability accommodation 
claim); Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims Make 
the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(J), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 519–20 (arguing that 
plaintiffs face “an insurmountable burden” in proving religious accommodation claims).  
7. Christmon, 735 F. App’x at 514 (concluding the accommodation was reasonable because it 
“allowed Mr. Christmon to avoid the conflict with his religious beliefs even if he lost the opportunity 
for overtime”). 
8. Id. 
9. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“The intent and effect of 
[Title VII’s reasonable accommodation provision] was to make it an unlawful employment 
practice . . . for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for 
the religious practices of his employees and prospective employees.”). 
10. Id. at 84. 
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deny religious accommodations in all but the narrowest circumstances.11 
But the courts did not stop there. They also have denied employees the 
right to select their preferred accommodation, have upheld 
accommodations that only partially resolve the conflict between an 
employee’s job and religion, and have been reluctant to require employers 
to engage in the same interactive process with an employee seeking a 
religious accommodation as they must with an employee seeking a 
disability accommodation.12 This judicial hostility toward religious 
accommodations has created a vast power imbalance between employers 
and religious-accommodation seekers. Employers wield virtual carte 
blanche over if, how, and when employees are accommodated, whereas 
employees have little, if any, say in such matters. 
This Article argues for the restoration of employees’ right to reasonable 
religious accommodations. It does so by first asserting that reasonableness 
under Title VII is a standalone requirement, separate and distinct from the 
statute’s undue hardship provision. While undue hardship should be 
evaluated from the employer’s perspective, reasonableness must be 
assessed from the employee’s point of view. Decoupling these terms 
would force courts to consider an accommodation’s impact on both the 
employer and the employee. The Article then proposes three requirements 
for an accommodation to be reasonable: (1) it must fully eliminate the 
conflict between the employee’s job and religious beliefs, (2) it must not 
cause the employee to suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) it 
must not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s terms or conditions 
of employment. This conceptualization of reasonableness comports with 
Congress’s intent that when possible, employees should not be forced to 
choose between their jobs and their religious convictions.13 
Had the Tenth Circuit applied this framework in Christmon v. B&B 
Airparts, Inc.,14 its analysis—and perhaps conclusion—would have been 
different. Instead of proclaiming the accommodation reasonable simply 
 
11. See infra section I.B.1. 
12. See infra section I.B.4. 
13. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that Title VII was designed to protect employees from choosing “between their religious 
convictions and their job”), rev’d on other grounds, 575 U.S. 768 (2015); Protos v. Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 
(1931)) (noting that Title VII’s accommodation requirement is “plainly intended to relieve individuals 
of the burden of choosing between their jobs and their religious convictions, where such relief will 
not unduly burden others”); Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s Choice Model 
for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 475–76 (2006) (recounting that the lead sponsor 
of Title VII’s religious accommodation bill believed it “would save employees the pain of having to 
choose between their religions and their jobs”). 
14. 735 F. App’x 510 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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because it allowed Christmon to keep his job, the court would have 
considered whether B&B’s decision to not fire Christmon for his Saturday 
absences was a reasonable accommodation from Christmon’s point of 
view. Because the accommodation eliminated the conflict between 
Christmon’s job and religion and did not constitute an adverse 
employment action, the court would have focused on the third element of 
reasonableness: whether the accommodation unnecessarily disadvantaged 
the terms or conditions of his employment. The accommodation 
disadvantaged Christmon by preventing him from earning overtime pay. 
Whether this disadvantage was “unnecessary” would depend on whether 
B&B, without undue hardship, could have accommodated Christmon in a 
manner less burdensome to his employment. The court would have probed 
the feasibility of B&B allowing Christmon to work his overtime on 
Sundays, as he requested, without suffering undue hardship to its 
business—a crucial question the Tenth Circuit ignored. If B&B could 
have accommodated Christmon in this manner (a very real possibility, 
given that it had allowed him to work on Sunday in at least one instance15), 
the company’s decision to accommodate him by not firing him would 
have been unreasonable because it unnecessarily disadvantaged 
his employment. 
The need for reasonable religious accommodations has never been 
greater. Religious discrimination charges filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have doubled over the 
past two decades, from 1,709 or 2.1% of all charges in 1997 to 3,436 or 
4.1% of all charges in 2017.16 The courts continue to whittle away at the 
right to religious accommodation at a time when they should be expanding 
it. Not only does the American workforce continue to grow more 
religiously diverse than ever,17 but employees are becoming increasingly 
 
15. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Christmon, 735 F. App’x 510 (No. 17-3209). 
16. See Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 19, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/8UT7-2SMX].  
17. See PAUL D. NUMRICH, THE FAITH NEXT DOOR: AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND THEIR NEW 
RELIGIOUS NEIGHBORS 6 (2009) (arguing that even skeptics of religious-affiliation data “admit that 
the United States is more religiously diverse today than ever before and will likely continue to 
diversify in the future”); ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL COX, AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS 
IDENTITY: FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 AMERICAN VALUES ATLAS 10 (2017), https://www.prri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U45-H8YG] (“The American 
religious landscape has undergone dramatic changes in the last decade and is more diverse today than 
at any time since modern sociological measurements began.”). Because immigration is largely driving 
the increase in religious diversification, both among and within religions, America’s religious 
landscape should continue to diversify so long as immigration rates remain steady. See DIANA L. ECK, 
A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S 
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intent on expressing their religious beliefs at work.18 Consequently, 
employers face tremendous pressure to accommodate a broader range of 
religious beliefs and behaviors with which they may have little or no 
familiarity,19 which can result in employers providing inadequate 
accommodations or, worse yet, no accommodation at all. If adopted, this 
Article’s conceptualization of reasonableness could help defuse what is 
becoming an explosive situation by ensuring that when an employer can 
accommodate an employee without undue hardship, the accommodation 
provided is reasonable to the employee. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background on the 
genesis of the right to workplace religious accommodations. It also details 
the judicial efforts to diminish this right. Part II focuses on the growing 
tendency of courts to read the reasonableness requirement out of 
Title VII’s religious accommodation provision. Part III explains why 
reasonableness and undue hardship are not two sides of the same coin but 
are in fact separate and distinct concepts that require analysis from 
different points of view. It draws upon Title VII’s text, legislative history, 
EEOC guidance, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and other judicial 
decisions to demonstrate why an accommodation’s reasonableness must 
be assessed from the employee’s perspective. Part IV proposes a test for 
reasonableness centered on how an accommodation impacts an 
 
MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 1–4 (2001) (explaining how immigration has contributed to 
greater internal diversity within established religious traditions); PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICA’S 
CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 53 (2015), https://www.pewforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/7/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S58E-SEV6] (noting 
that the vast majority of Hindus and Muslims in the United States are either immigrants or children 
of immigrants). 
18. See Sonia Ghumman, Ann Marie Ryan, Lizabeth A. Barclay & Karen S. Markel, Religious 
Discrimination in the Workplace: A Review and Examination of Current and Future Trends, 28 J. 
BUS. & PSYCH. 439, 449 (2013) (citing studies in support of their conclusion that “[a]s American 
organizations increasingly promote diverse workplaces in the belief that diversity adds value for their 
organizations, the number of organizations allowing such workplace religious expression has 
expanded” and “the number of employees who wish to express their religion at work has increased”); 
see also Dallan F. Flake, Image Is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious Accommodation in 
the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 706–08 (2015) (explaining that increased religious expression 
in the workplace is attributable to demographic factors such as the aging baby boomer generation, 
cultural factors such as workers’ expectations of being able to express their whole selves in the 
workplace, religious factors such as increased public evangelism, and reimagined workplaces in 
which employees are free to express themselves). 
19. See Ghumman et al., supra note 18, at 449 (“[A]lthough most American workplaces may be 
secular in nature, the majority of work policies and procedures favor Christian practices and 
observances (i.e., no work on Sundays, Christmas is considered a federal holiday) . . . . As religious 
diversity increases, some of the religions gaining increasing representation in America (i.e., Muslims, 
Sikhs) may have certain religious-based obligations requiring expression and requests for religious 
accommodations such as religious holidays during regular workdays, time off for prayer/rituals, 
religious attire, and grooming practices will also inevitably increase.”). 
Flake (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:14 PM 
2020] RESTORING REASONABLENESS 1679 
 
employee’s ability to practice their religion and perform their job. It also 
explores the potential impact of adopting this conceptualization 
of reasonableness. 
I. THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION 
This Part begins with background on how Title VII came to require 
accommodation of religious beliefs. Understanding the origins of the 
religious accommodation provision is key to why an accommodation’s 
reasonableness must be evaluated from the employee’s point of view. It 
then examines how the courts have cut away at the right to 
accommodation to the point it is practically nonexistent. 
A. Origins 
Enacted as part of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII 
makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”20 Title VII initially did not require employers to provide 
religious accommodations.21 This quickly became problematic because 
even though an employer could not terminate an employee because of 
their religion, the statute in no way limited the employer’s ability to 
terminate an employee whose religious beliefs interfered with their job 
performance.22 Thus, it was illegal for an employer to terminate an 
 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). How religion came to be included as a protected class is something 
of a mystery, as the legislative history indicates Congress’s near singular focus was on enacting 
legislation to eradicate racial discrimination in employment. See Julia Bruzina, Erickson v. Bartell: 
The “Common Sense” Approach to Employer-Based Insurance for Women, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 463, 
474 (2003) (explaining how the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shows Congress’s 
focus “was primarily, if not solely, on race”); Sabina F. Crocette, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age 
Discrimination Claims by Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis–A Pragmatic 
Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 115, 122 (1998) (“When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act 
in 1964, its central focus was to eradicate race discrimination against African-Americans and other 
minority groups.”); James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1023, 1034 (2004) (“[T]here is little in the way of legislative history to determine whether 
Congress considered religion an immutable characteristic, whether it was singled out for protection 
based on its historical importance in the constitutional context, or for some other reason.”). At any 
rate, its inclusion in Title VII places religion on equal footing with race, color, sex, and national origin. 
21. Marion K. McDonald, Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory Religious 
Accommodation in the Workplace, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 121, 136–37 (1984) (“When it was first enacted 
in 1964, title VII did not contain a religious accommodation provision.”). 
22. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (“The prohibition against 
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employee for belonging to the Seventh Day Adventist faith, but the 
employer was well within its right to fire the employee if they were unable 
to work on Saturdays because of their religious beliefs. This loophole 
allowed employers to indirectly discriminate against employees because 
of their religious beliefs without running afoul of the statute. 
Inundated with complaints from employees whose employers refused 
to allow them time off to observe their Sabbath or religious holidays,23 the 
EEOC issued guidelines in 1966,24 which it refined in 1967, suggesting 
employers bore an affirmative duty to “make reasonable accommodations 
to the religious needs of employees . . . where such accommodations can 
be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”25 This was a fairly radical proposition for its time. Up until 
then, antidiscrimination statutes were entirely proscriptive in the sense 
that they merely prohibited employers from taking discriminatory action. 
Not surprisingly, this guidance carried little weight with the courts. The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was particularly hostile to the notion of 
accommodation, holding in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.26 that the 
EEOC’s position was inconsistent with Title VII, as the legislative history 
did not reflect any “Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person 
to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another.”27 
When the Supreme Court affirmed Dewey by an equally divided court 
in 1971,28 West Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph, himself a Seventh 
Day Baptist, responded by leading a charge to amend Title VII to require 
religious accommodation.29 Congress was more open to this idea than the 
courts had been, as Senator Randolph’s bill sailed through both chambers 
 
religious discrimination soon raised the question of whether it was impermissible under [Title VII] to 
discharge or refuse to hire a person who for religious reasons refused to work during the employer’s 
normal workweek.”).  
23. See Thomas D. Brierton, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under Title VII: Is It Reasonable to 
the Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 167 (2002) (recounting that the EEOC “raised the 
issue of reasonable accommodation two years after the law had gone into effect due to complaints 
from religious employees that employers were refusing to allow them to take time off during the 
regular work week in order to observe holy days”). 
24. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (June 15, 1966) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605). 
25. 32 Fed. Reg. 10298 (July 13, 1967) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605). 
26. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per 
curiam). 
27. Id. at 334. 
28. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 689 (1971). 
29. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection 
of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 584 
(2000) (“The amendment was introduced by Senator Jennings Randolph, a Seventh-Day Baptist, with 
the express purpose of protecting Sabbatarians.”). 
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with almost no scrutiny.30 Enacted just one year after Dewey, the 
amendment closely tracked the EEOC’s guidelines by expanding the 
definition of “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective 
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on 
the conduct of the employer’s business.”31 Although this language has 
remained unchanged in the decades since, how the courts have interpreted 
and applied it has evolved significantly. 
B. Erosion 
The amendment of Title VII did not end judicial skepticism of religious 
accommodations. Just five years later, the Supreme Court effectively 
gutted the amendment by setting the bar for undue hardship as low as 
possible.32 But instead of attempting to minimize the damage, subsequent 
courts piled on. They not only embraced the low standard for undue 
hardship but also found further ways to strip the religious accommodation 
provision of its force. 
1. Undue Hardship 
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,33 the Supreme Court 
considered the circumstances under which an employer could deny a 
religious accommodation because of undue hardship.34 When Larry 
Hardison joined the Worldwide Church of God, he asked to be excused 
from Saturday shifts to observe his Sabbath.35 TWA agreed to allow him 
to seek a change of work assignments to accommodate his religious needs, 
but the union that represented him refused because it would have violated 
the collective bargaining agreement.36 TWA rejected a proposal that 
Hardison only work four days per week.37 Leaving the position empty or 
filling it with an employee from another area would have impaired 
operations, and employing someone not regularly assigned to Saturday 
 
30. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing that Title VII’s 
religious accommodation measure “was passed by a unanimous vote in the Senate” and “similar 
approval by the House of Representatives”). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
32. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
33. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
34. Id. at 84. 
35. Id. at 67–68. 
36. Id. at 68. 
37. Id. 
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shifts would have required the company to pay overtime wages.38 TWA 
ultimately concluded it could not accommodate Hardison without undue 
hardship, a determination Hardison challenged in subsequent litigation.39 
The district court sided with TWA, but the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed.40 In overturning the appellate court, the Supreme Court 
famously declared that requiring an employer “to bear more than a de 
minimis cost” to accommodate an employee’s religious needs constitutes 
undue hardship.41 In doing so, the Court applied one of the lowest legal 
standards42 to a statutory phrase that ordinarily denotes more stringency.43 
Because accommodating Hardison would have imposed more than a de 
minimis cost to TWA, the company had no duty to accommodate him 
at all.44 
The Hardison decision drew immediate criticism, most notably from 
Justice Marshall, who, in his blistering dissent, lamented that the majority 
opinion “deal[t] a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate 
work requirements to religious practices.”45 He found the decision 
“deeply troubling” as a matter of social policy because it forced 
employees into “the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their 
job” and “intolerable” as a matter of law because it “adopt[ed] the very 
position that Congress expressly rejected in 1972, as if we were free to 
disregard congressional choices that a majority of this Court 
 
38. Id. at 68–69. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 69–70. 
41. Id. at 84. 
42. Translated from Latin, “de minimis” means “of the least.” De minimis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 524 (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “de minimis” as “trifling,” 
“negligible,” and “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.” Id. Courts 
have characterized the standard in a similar manner. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (interpreting the de minimis standard as so low that employers “need not grant even the 
most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow their faith”); Faul v. 
Potter, 355 F. App’x 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2009) (referring to the standard as “minimal”); Beyer v. Cnty. 
of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the standard is “neither onerous, nor intended 
to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic” (citation omitted)); Dupree v. UHAB-Sterling St. Hous. Dev. 
Fund Corp., No. 10-CV-1894, 2012 WL 3288234, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) (stating the 
standard is “not a heavy burden”); Franklin v. Astrue, No. 11-615-MJP-MAT, 2012 WL 3059407, at 
*2 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2012) (referring to the standard as “extremely low”). 
43. See Undue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “undue” as “excessive or 
unwarranted”); Hardship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “hardship” as 
“privation; suffering or adversity”). The Court’s interpretation of “undue hardship” in Title VII stands 
in stark contrast to how Congress defined the term in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
Similar to Title VII, it requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities 
absent undue hardship, which the statute defines as “an action requiring significant difficulty or 
expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
44. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84–85. 
45. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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thinks unwise.”46 
Rather than question Hardison’s soundness, the lower courts have 
embraced it, routinely granting employers summary judgment if an 
accommodation would impose on the employer virtually any burden at 
all.47 In fact, some courts have gone so far as to grant employers summary 
judgment, not because of any actual hardship, but because of the mere 
possibility of hardship in the future.48 
The courts’ willingness to strike down many religious accommodation 
claims on undue hardship grounds has prompted litigants to petition the 
Supreme Court to overrule Hardison.49 To date, the Court has declined to 
revisit the issue. Likewise, Congress has repeatedly considered amending 
Title VII to raise the undue hardship standard via the Workplace Religious 
Freedom Act (WRFA).50 The most recent version of the legislation noted 
that Hardison had “narrowed the scope of protection of [T]itle VII against 
religious discrimination in employment, contrary to the intent of 
Congress,” and consequently, “discrimination against employees on the 
basis of religion in employment continues to be an unfortunate and 
unacceptable reality.”51 Despite bipartisan support,52 WRFA has never 
come particularly close to passing.53 
 
46. Id. at 87.  
47. See, e.g., Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
“mere possibility of an adverse impact” was enough to constitute undue hardship after Hardison). 
48. See, e.g., Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581, 588–89 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
the employee’s request for a scheduling accommodation “would produce undue hardship for 
Walgreens in the future” based on the possibility that the employer would have been required to 
reschedule certain training sessions); Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 519–20 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (approving and applying Weber’s “mere possibility” standard). 
49. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28–34, Patterson, 727 F. App’x 581 (No. 18-349) 
(petitioning the Supreme Court to revisit Hardison on the ground the decision was poorly reasoned 
and runs contrary to congressional intent; petition denied). 
50. See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008); 
H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 893, 
108th Cong. (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1668, 106th 
Cong. (1999); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong. 
(1997); H.R. 4117, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 2071, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (1994). 
51. S. 3686, 112th Cong. § 2(3)–(4) (2012). 
52. See, for example, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007), which was introduced by an equal number 
of Republican and Democratic Representatives. See generally LORRAINE C. MILLER, CLERK OF THE 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICIAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR PLACES OF RESIDENCE (2009) (showing the party affiliation of 
every member of the House of Representatives of the 110th Congress). 
53. The legislation died in committee the last time it was proposed. See S. 3686 (112th): Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3686#ov
erview [https://perma.cc/V964-DN69]. 
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2. Preferred Accommodation 
Nine years after Hardison, the Supreme Court dealt a second blow to 
religious accommodations by holding in Ansonia Board of Education v. 
Philbrook54 that employees are not entitled to their preferred 
accommodation in a scenario where multiple accommodation options 
exist.55 Ronald Philbrook was a high school teacher, who, like Hardison, 
belonged to the Worldwide Church of God.56 His faith required him to 
refrain from performing secular work during designated holy days, which 
caused him to miss approximately six school days annually.57 Under the 
applicable bargaining agreement, Philbrook could take up to three days of 
paid leave each year to observe mandatory religious holidays.58 The 
contract also allowed teachers to use three additional days of accumulated 
leave each year for “necessary personal business” but limited such leave 
to uses not otherwise specified in the contract, including observance of 
religious holidays.59 For years, Philbrook observed his religious holidays 
by using his three days of paid leave granted in the contract and then 
taking unpaid leave for the remaining religious holidays.60 He eventually 
stopped this practice and instead opted to schedule medical appointments 
on the holy days, which allowed him to use his accumulated sick leave 
and therefore be paid for those absences.61 Philbrook grew dissatisfied 
with this arrangement and asked the school board to either allow him to 
use his personal business leave for religious observance, which was his 
preferred arrangement, or pay him his full wages less the cost of a 
substitute teacher for the additional days off.62 The board rejected both 
proposals, prompting Philbrook to file suit alleging the board failed to 
reasonably accommodate his religious needs.63 
The district court ruled for the school board, concluding Philbrook had 
not suffered religious discrimination because the board had not placed him 
in a position of violating his religion or losing his job.64 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that if an employer and an 
 
54. 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
55. Id. at 68.  
56. Id. at 62. 
57. Id. at 62–63. 
58. Id. at 63–64. 
59. Id. at 64. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 64–65. 
63. Id. at 65. 
64. Id. 
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employee each propose an accommodation, the employer must accept the 
employee’s preferred accommodation unless such accommodation would 
impose undue hardship.65 The Supreme Court rejected the appellate 
court’s rule, holding that once an employer offers any reasonable 
accommodation, it has fulfilled its duty and has no further obligation to 
consider other accommodations proposed by the employee, even if they, 
too, are reasonable and would not impose undue hardship.66 
As with Hardison, lower courts have embraced Ansonia.67 This 
undoubtedly simplifies the judicial task in cases where multiple 
accommodations are possible. A court need only ask whether the 
employer provided a reasonable accommodation without having to further 
consider the availability of alternatives, whether such alternatives would 
have imposed undue hardship on the employer, or whether the employer 
was aware of such possibilities. But while ignoring the possibility of 
alternative accommodations is certainly easier for courts, this further 
shifts power from the employee to the employer to determine the 
appropriate accommodation. Consequently, employees have even less say 
over if or how they are accommodated. 
3. Partial Accommodation 
While some courts are adamant that an accommodation must eliminate 
the conflict between work and religion,68 a growing number are taking the 
opposite view. For example, in EEOC v. Thompson Contracting, Grading, 
Paving, & Utilities, Inc.,69 a dump truck driver requested Saturdays off for 
 
65. Id. at 65–66. 
66. Id. at 68. (“By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the 
employer is sufficient to meets its accommodation obligation . . . . Thus, where the employer has 
already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. 
The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would 
result in undue hardship.”). 
67. See, e.g., Newton v. Potter, No. 9:05-3165-PMD, 2007 WL 1035002, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 
2007) (holding that because “an employee is not entitled to the accommodation of his or her 
preference,” the plaintiff had no ground for arguing the accommodation provided to her was 
unreasonable, even though it nearly tripled the length of her daily commute (quoting Ansonia, 479 
U.S. at 70)). 
68. See, e.g., Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 547–48 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
employer’s offer to accommodate the employee who was unable to work Sundays for religious 
reasons by giving him a Sunday shift that allowed him to attend his religious service “was no 
accommodation at all because . . . it would not permit him to observe his religious requirement to 
abstain from work totally on Sundays”); EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 
1997) (en banc) (holding that the employer’s offer to give a Jewish worker who requested Yom 
Kippur off a different day off “cannot be considered reasonable . . . because it does not eliminate the 
conflict between the employment requirement and the religious practice”). 
69. 793 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 275 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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religious reasons.70 The district court concluded the company satisfied its 
duty under Title VII by invoking its paid personal leave policy—even 
though the policy did not apply to the driver.71 The court reasoned that 
“[a]lthough as a 90-day probationary employee, [the driver] was not yet 
able to take advantage of this policy, this fact ‘does not negate the 
reasonableness of the accommodation.’”72 Thus, the court upheld as 
reasonable an accommodation that was unavailable to the employee and 
therefore did not eliminate the conflict between his job and 
religious beliefs. 
In George v. Home Depot, Inc.,73 a store greeter asked to not work 
Sundays, consistent with her Catholic faith. Home Depot responded by 
offering to schedule her Sunday shifts around her church services.74 The 
district court concluded this constituted a reasonable accommodation even 
though it did not resolve the conflict between the employee’s job and 
religious beliefs.75 
Similarly, in Henry v. Rexam Beverage Can of North America,76 a 
mechanic requested Saturdays off to observe his Sabbath. His employer 
initially allowed him to swap shifts with coworkers and to pay them $100 
out of his own pocket to give them the equivalent of “premium overtime 
pay.”77 But when his employer later informed him that he had to cease this 
practice because the payments violated company policy, nobody would 
swap shifts with him.78 Nevertheless, the district court held that the 
company reasonably accommodated the employee by allowing him to ask 
coworkers to trade shifts with him, even though none of them would do 
so.79 In each of these cases, the courts held that the employer fulfilled its 
accommodation duty even though the employee was still faced with 
having to choose between his job and his religious beliefs. 
4. Interactive Process 
Courts further manifest their disdain for religious accommodations 
through their reluctance to require employers to engage in the same 
 
70. Id. at 742–43. 
71. Id. at 745. 
72. Id. 
73. No. 00-2616, 2001 WL 1558315, at *5, *8 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2001), aff’d, 51 F. App’x 482 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
74. Id. at *8. 
75. Id. at *7–9. 
76. No. 3:10-2800-MBS-SVH, 2012 WL 2501994, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2012). 
77. Id. at *2. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at *8. 
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interactive process with religious-accommodation seekers as they do with 
disability-accommodation seekers.80 The interactive process generally 
requires an employer and an employee to work together in good faith to 
determine whether the employee can be reasonably accommodated, for 
the employer to give due consideration to the employee’s preferred 
accommodation, and for the employer to ultimately select the 
accommodation most suitable for both parties.81 Neither Title VII nor the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) references an interactive 
process, but the EEOC has nonetheless interpreted both statutes as 
requiring it.82 The courts uniformly follow the EEOC’s guidance in 
requiring the interactive process for disability accommodations, yet they 
have been much slower to mandate it for religious accommodations.83 
This is puzzling, given the courts’ own recognition that the ADA and 
Title VII should be interpreted consistently whenever possible.84 
 
80. See Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodations, 71 ALA. L. REV. 67, 86–89 (2019) 
(detailing how courts are hesitant to apply the interactive process requirement to religious 
accommodations claims and offering possible reasons why this might be the case). 
81. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2019).  
82. See id. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be 
necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a 
disability in need of the accommodation.”); Flake, supra note 80, at 83–86 (detailing the EEOC’s 
position that the interactive process applies to religious accommodations, as set forth in the 
Commission’s Compliance Manual, press releases, legal briefs, administrative decisions, and consent 
decrees). 
83. Compare Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(“Identifying reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee requires both employer and 
employee to engage in a flexible interactive process.”), and Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 
F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once an employer becomes aware of the need for accommodation, 
that employer has a mandatory obligation under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with the 
employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations.”), with Miller v. Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 351 F. Supp. 3d 762, 787 (D.N.J. 2018) (acknowledging courts “have not been 
consistent” in deciding whether the interactive process applies to religious accommodations), and 
Bolden v. Caravan Facilities Mgmt., LLC, 112 F. Supp. 3d 785, 791 (N.D. Ind. 2015) (noting the 
absence of authority suggesting the interactive process applies to religious accommodations), and 
Dodd v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 06-4213, 2008 WL 2902618, at *9 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2008) 
(questioning whether the interactive process applies to religious accommodations where the plaintiff 
failed to “offer any legal authority for the proposition”). 
84. See, e.g., Garity v. APWU Nat’l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 858 n.9 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that “due to the similarities in language and purpose between the two statutes, courts around the 
country—unless they find a good reason to do otherwise—generally use Title VII precedent to 
interpret ADA claims”); EEOC v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.11 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Due 
to the similarities between the ADA and Title VII, we generally interpret those statutes 
consistently.”); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We 
conclude that the language of Title VII and the ADA dictates a consistent reading of the two 
statutes.”); Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., No. C94-3008, 1996 WL 33423409, at *2 (N.D. Iowa 
Sept. 17, 1996) (relying on ADA case law, which the court characterized as “useful instruction,” to 
determine whether the failure to accommodate constitutes a form of intentional discrimination under 
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Requiring the interactive process for disability accommodations but not 
for religious accommodations means employees seeking a disability 
accommodation can rightfully expect employers to seek their input 
regarding potential accommodations and to duly consider their preferred 
accommodation, whereas employees seeking a religious accommodation 
cannot expect to have this same level of involvement. Reluctance to 
extend the interactive process requirement to religious accommodations 
constitutes a subtle, yet powerful, way in which courts continue to shift 
the power dynamic ever further in employers’ favor. 
II. READING OUT REASONABLENESS 
In recent years, courts have employed a new tactic to further diminish 
Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement. Despite the statute’s 
clear mandate that employers must provide reasonable religious 
accommodations, courts are effectively reading this requirement out of 
the statute. Eliminating the reasonableness requirement further strips the 
statute of its force, as employers can offer whatever accommodation they 
want, regardless of how it might adversely affect the employee’s terms or 
conditions of employment, so long as the employee is allowed to keep 
their job. This Part examines the various ways courts do this, including by 
conflating reasonableness and undue hardship, by setting the bar for 
reasonableness too low, and by ignoring the requirement altogether. 
A. Conflating Reasonableness and Undue Hardship 
One way courts are reading the reasonableness requirement out of 
Title VII is by conflating reasonableness with the statute’s undue hardship 
provision. These courts consider reasonableness and undue hardship as 
two sides of the same coin: an accommodation is reasonable only if it does 
not cause the employer undue hardship. Equating reasonableness to undue 
hardship renders the reasonableness requirement superfluous and 
nonsensical, as the validity of an accommodation then turns on whether it 
would cause undue hardship to the employer. And yet, that is precisely 
 
Title VII). The need for consistency between the ADA and Title VII is likewise expressed in the 
legislative history to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, wherein the Judiciary Committee made clear 
its “inten[t] that these other laws modeled after Title VII [including the ADA] be interpreted 
consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act.” JUDICIARY COMM., H.R. 
REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. Theoretically, the 
discrepancy could be attributable to the fact that courts owe the EEOC’s ADA guidelines Chevron 
deference but only need apply Skidmore deference to the Commission’s religious accommodation 
guidance. See Flake, supra note 80, at 85. But even under Skidmore, there is no reason for a court to 
reject the EEOC’s position, as there is nothing about its view that the interactive process applies to 
religious accommodations that seems “hasty, invalid, or inconsistent.” Id. at 88. 
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what several courts have held. 
In EEOC v. Universal Manufacturing Co.,85 the Fifth Circuit expressed 
a view of reasonableness focused entirely on how the accommodation 
would impact the employer: “Reasonableness seems to focus more upon 
the cost to the employer, the extent of positive involvement which the 
employer must exercise, and the existence of overt discrimination by the 
employer.”86 How the accommodation would impact the employee is 
wholly omitted from this court’s conceptualization of reasonableness. 
Consistent with this position, the Fourth Circuit noted in EEOC v. 
Firestone Fibers & Textile Co.87 that while reasonableness and undue 
hardship are “separate and distinct” inquiries, they are “interrelated” and 
“there is much overlap between the two.”88 It explained that “‘reasonably 
accommodate’ in the religious context incorporates more than just 
whether the conflict between the employee’s beliefs and employer’s work 
requirements have been eliminated. Considering an accommodation’s 
impact on both the employer and coworkers, for example, is appropriate 
when determining its reasonableness.”89 Here, the court expanded its 
consideration of reasonableness to include how an accommodation would 
affect coworkers, yet it continued to ignore how the accommodation 
would impact the accommodation seeker himself. In affirming summary 
judgment for Firestone, the court rejected the argument that the employer 
should have accommodated the plaintiff, who needed extra time off for 
religious observance, by making an exception to its sixty-hour cap on 
unpaid leave.90 The court held that the accommodation was 
unreasonable—not that it would impose undue hardship—because of “the 
sheer number of hours a small group of coworkers would have been forced 
to cover,” which in turn risked “lowering morale by displaying favoritism, 
impinging on the shift rights of other employees, and violating the CBA 
and its seniority-based scheduling system.”91 The EEOC sharply criticized 
the court’s approach, explaining in its Compliance Manual that Firestone 
“conflicts with longstanding Commission and judicial precedent” because 
it “analyz[es] reasonableness of proposed accommodation based on facts 
typically considered as part of undue hardship analysis.”92 
 
85. 914 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1990). 
86. Id. at 73 n.3. 
87. 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008). 
88. Id. at 314. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 317. 
91. Id. at 318–19. 
92. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL NO. 915.003, 
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The tendency of courts to assess reasonableness from the employer’s 
point of view is evident in a variety of other judicial opinions. In Adeyeye 
v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC,93 a case involving an employee’s request 
for unpaid leave to return to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial rights, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that “[r]easonableness is 
assessed in context, of course, and this evaluation will turn in part on 
whether or not the employer can in fact continue to function absent undue 
hardship if the employee is permitted to take unpaid leave on the needed 
schedule.”94 In Williams v. Harvey,95 the district court characterized 
Hardison as standing for the proposition that “[a]ccommodations are 
deemed unreasonable if they cause an employer undue hardship, that is, 
they result in ‘more than a de minimis cost to the employer.’”96 And in 
Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, G.P.,97 the district court considered the 
appropriateness of a scheduling accommodation that would have required 
a coworker to work nearly twenty-two hours in a thirty-two hour span.98 
It concluded “this scenario would have indeed created an undue hardship 
that would have rendered [the] request . . . unreasonable.”99 Thus, the 
court determined the reasonableness of the accommodation by whether it 
would cause the employer vis-à-vis a coworker undue hardship. Finally, 
it is telling that some courts have actually combined reasonableness and 
undue hardship into a single term: “unreasonable hardship.”100 
B. Lowering the Reasonableness Bar 
Even courts that acknowledge undue hardship and reasonableness as 
 
SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION § 12-IV(A)(3) n.130 (2008) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL], https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html#_ftn130 [https://perma.cc/BGK4-
VFMB]. 
93. 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013). 
94. Id. at 447, 455. 
95. No. 4:05-CV-161, 2006 WL 2456406 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2006). 
96. Id. at *11.  
97. 719 F. Supp. 2d 918, 932 (W.D. Tenn. 2010). 
98. Id. at 931–32. 
99. Id. at 932.  
100. See, e.g., Franks v. Nebraska, No. 4:10-CV-3145, 2012 WL 71707, at *12 (D. Neb. Jan. 10, 
2012) (“If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show either 
that it offered the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation or that doing so would cause the employer to 
suffer an unreasonable hardship.”); Adams v. Retail Ventures, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-120-SEB-WGH, 
2008 WL 11452088, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2008) (holding that the proposed accommodation “would 
have resulted in an unreasonable hardship” to the employer); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
No. 3:04-CV-000206-WRW, 2006 WL 318828, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 9, 2006) (“An employer is 
required to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of their employees unless such 
an accommodation would cause the employer unreasonable hardship.”). 
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distinct concepts can nonetheless eviscerate the reasonableness 
requirement by setting the bar for what is reasonable so low it is virtually 
meaningless. Title VII does not define reasonableness, nor has the 
Supreme Court provided a definition. However, the Court provided 
important guidance on this issue in Ansonia. While the case is best known 
for its holding that employees are not entitled to their preferred 
accommodation, it is also noteworthy for its analysis of whether the 
accommodation the school board offered (unpaid leave for religious-
based absences) was reasonable. The district court entered judgment for 
the board, concluding the accommodation was reasonable because it did 
not place Philbrook “in a position of violating his religion or losing his 
job” since he was able to miss work to observe his religious holidays and 
remain employed.101 The appellate court likewise assumed the leave 
policy constituted a reasonable accommodation, but it went on to hold that 
where an employer and an employee both propose a reasonable 
accommodation, the employer must accept the employee’s proposal 
absent undue hardship.102 While the appellate court’s approach 
commanded most of the Supreme Court’s attention, the Court addressed 
the reasonableness of the accommodation, explaining that “[b]ecause both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an 
erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question.”103 
Dissatisfied with the district court’s determination that an accommodation 
is per se reasonable so long as it permits an employee to practice his 
religion and keep his job, the Court engaged in a more nuanced analysis. 
It agreed “[t]he provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between 
employment requirements and religious practices”—but its inquiry did 
not end there.104 The Court went on to explain that not only did the 
accommodation eliminate the conflict, but it also merely caused him to 
lose income for the days he did not work.105 “[S]uch an exclusion,” the 
Court noted, “has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities 
or job status.”106 Crucially, the Court did not assess the accommodation’s 
reasonableness solely by whether it eliminated the conflict between 
 
101. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., No. N 77-489, 1984 WL 49016, at *9 (D. Conn. May 18, 
1984). 
102. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1985). 
103. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).  
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 71. The Court ultimately remanded the case because of a factual dispute as to whether 
the school board’s personal leave provision was applied in a discriminatory manner, i.e., that teachers 
could use it for secular reasons but not religious ones. Id. The Court held that if this were the case, 
the accommodation would not be reasonable. Id. 
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Philbrook’s job and religion but also by how it might have otherwise 
impacted the terms and conditions of his employment. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s directive that reasonableness depends on 
whether the accommodation eliminates the conflict and how the 
accommodation otherwise affects the employee’s employment, courts 
routinely cite Ansonia for the proposition that an accommodation is 
reasonable simply if it eliminates the conflict between the employee’s job 
and religious beliefs.107 This interpretation misconstrues Ansonia by 
omitting further inquiry into how an accommodation affects an 
employee’s employment opportunities or job status. In essence, these 
courts approach reasonableness the same way the district court did in 
Ansonia—which the Supreme Court explicitly disapproved as 
“erroneous.”108 Whether an accommodation eliminates the conflict 
between an employee’s job and religion should be the starting point, not 
the deciding factor, for whether the accommodation is reasonable. 
The practical consequence of this misreading of Ansonia is that courts 
often assess reasonableness solely by whether an accommodation 
eliminates the conflict between an employee’s job and religion. In some 
cases, an accommodation is deemed reasonable even if it does not fully 
eliminate the conflict.109 This undoubtedly simplifies the judicial task, as 
courts need only determine whether the accommodation allowed the 
employee to remain employed without having to consider how it might 
otherwise impact the employee. But this simplification comes at a cost: 
An accommodation that harms an employee in other ways is deemed 
reasonable as a matter of law simply because it allows the employee to 
keep their job and practice their religion. For example, in Newton v. 
Potter,110 a letter carrier requested to not work Saturdays in accordance 
with her religious beliefs.111 The U.S. Postal Service transferred the 
employee to a post office that did not require Saturday work but 
lengthened her daily commute from twenty-two to sixty-six miles each 
way—an extra 440 miles per week.112 The court granted the Postal Service 
 
107. See, e.g., Walker v. Indian River Transp. Co., 741 F. App’x 740, 746 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting 
that “the Supreme Court has explained that a reasonable accommodation is one that ‘eliminates the 
conflict between employment requirements and religious practices’”); Sturgill v. UPS, Inc., 512 F.3d 
1024, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “an accommodation is reasonable as a matter of law if it 
eliminates a religious conflict”); Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581, 584 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“A reasonable accommodation is one that eliminates the conflict between employment 
requirements and religious practices.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
108. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 68–79. 
110. No. 9:05-3165-PMD, 2007 WL 1035002 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2007).  
111. Id. at *2. 
112. Id. at *4 n.2. 
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summary judgment without even considering how this longer commute 
impacted the employee’s employment.113 It deemed the accommodation 
reasonable as a matter of law because it allowed the employee to avoid 
Saturday work and keep her job.114 
Similarly, in Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, Inc.,115 a 
hospital terminated a counselor who refused to counsel clients in ways 
that conflicted with her religious beliefs.116 In affirming summary 
judgment for the employer, the Fifth Circuit explained that the availability 
of lower-paying non-counselor positions would have constituted a 
reasonable accommodation because the employee could have remained 
employed while avoiding having to provide counseling that conflicted 
with her religious beliefs.117 It was unimportant to the court that these non-
counselor positions would have required the employee to take a 
“significant” pay cut.118 The court explained that such a reduction in salary 
alone does not make an accommodation unreasonable.119 
In Smith v. Concentra, Inc.,120 a front office specialist sued her 
employer for failing to reasonably accommodate her Islamic beliefs, 
which required her to attend daily religious programs from 4 p.m. to 6 
p.m.121 The employee was initially scheduled to work from 7 a.m. to 4 
p.m., but her hours were later changed to 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.122 Concentra 
offered to accommodate the employee by allowing her to end her shift two 
hours early, but this arrangement shortened her workday by two hours and 
consequently diminished her earnings.123 The employee requested to 
return to her 7 a.m. shift or, alternatively, to be transferred to a different 
position for which she was qualified that would have allowed her to work 
a full shift before 4 p.m.124 The court did not consider the feasibility of the 
proposed alternatives, holding instead that Concentra reasonably 
accommodated the employee as a matter of law by allowing her to leave 
 
113. Id. at *4. 
114. Id. 
115. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001). 
116. Id. at 497–99. 
117. Id. at 501–02. 
118. Id. at 502 n.23. 
119. Id.; see also Vaughn v. Waffle House, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (N.D. Tex. 2003) 
(holding that the employer’s offer to transfer the plaintiff to a different position that would exempt 
him from Sabbath work was reasonable because it eliminated the conflict between the employee’s job 
and religion, even though the new position paid $10,000 less per year than his previous position). 
120. 240 F. Supp. 3d 778 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
121. Id. at 781. 
122. Id. at 781–82. 
123. Id. at 785. 
124. Id. at 785–86. 
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work two hours early, regardless of the effect on her pay.125 The court 
explained that it was “aware of no authority requiring that reasonable 
accommodations permit an employee to work as many hours as they 
otherwise would be entitled to.”126 
In each of the foregoing cases, the courts held the accommodations 
were reasonable as a matter of law simply because they allowed the 
employees to keep their jobs and observe their religious beliefs. But while 
remaining employed is a necessary component of reasonableness, the 
Supreme Court made clear in Ansonia that it is not sufficient.127 If the only 
criterion for reasonableness is that the accommodation allows the 
employee to keep her job, an employer could offer any accommodation it 
likes that fulfills this requirement, even if the accommodation so 
adversely affects the employee in other ways that it is 
effectively meaningless. 
C. Ignoring Reasonableness 
A final way courts nullify the reasonableness requirement is by 
ignoring it altogether. The Supreme Court may have intentionally or 
unintentionally endorsed this tactic in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc.,128 its most recent foray into religious accommodation 
jurisprudence. The issue before the Court was whether Abercrombie could 
be liable for refusing to hire an applicant who it suspected, but did not 
know, would require a religious-based exemption from its dress code.129 
The bulk of the Court’s opinion focuses on whether Abercrombie’s 
actions were discriminatory, given the company’s lack of actual 
knowledge that the applicant would need an accommodation, and thus is 
not particularly illuminating as to the question of reasonableness.130 But 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, dropped a footnote that could 
potentially impact how courts analyze this issue.131 In response to Justice 
Alito’s concurrence arguing the plaintiff does not bear the burden to prove 
failure to accommodate,132 Justice Scalia explained that if an employer “is 
willing to ‘accommodate’—which means nothing more than allowing the 
plaintiff to engage in her religious practice despite the employer’s normal 
 
125. Id. at 785. 
126. Id. 
127. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1986). 
128. 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
129. Id. at 2031. 
130. Id. at 2032–34. 
131. Id. at 2032 n.2. 
132. Id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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rules to the contrary—adverse action ‘because of’ the religious practice is 
not shown.”133 The statement is striking because it omits the 
reasonableness qualifier altogether and could be read as endorsing the 
district court’s approach in Ansonia,134 which the Supreme Court rejected 
as “erroneous.”135 It is possible Justice Scalia was merely defining the 
term in isolation, and that his omission of reasonableness was because the 
Court had not been called on to assess the reasonableness of the 
accommodation. But if accommodation really means “nothing more” than 
allowing an employee to practice her religion and keep her job, as a literal 
reading of the footnote suggests, this would obviate the need for courts to 
assess reasonableness beyond whether the accommodation enabled the 
employee to remain employed.136 
It is not uncommon for courts to determine an accommodation’s 
validity solely in terms of undue hardship.137 On some level, this makes 
sense. Because the bar for undue hardship is so low, many 
accommodation claims fail at this stage, since by definition 
accommodation requires an employer to do something out of the 
ordinary.138 There is no point in analyzing whether an accommodation is 
reasonable to the employee if the accommodation cannot clear the undue 
hardship bar in the first place. I am not suggesting courts should assess 
reasonableness in addition to or before addressing undue hardship. But 
rather than treat undue hardship as the only question, as is often the 
case,139 courts should view it as the threshold question. Thus, in those 
 
133. Id. at 2032 n.2 (majority opinion).  
134. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65 (1986). 
135. Id. at 70. 
136. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct at 2028 n.2. Given the recency of this decision, it is unclear what 
impact, if any, it will have on how courts evaluate reasonableness. To date, two circuit courts and one 
district court have cited Abercrombie for its definition of accommodation. See Tabura v. Kellogg 
USA, 880 F.3d 544, 550 (10th Cir. 2018); Christmon v. B&B Airparts, Inc., 735 F. App’x 510, 514 
(10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1064 (9th Cir. 2016); Hittle v. City of 
Stockton, No. 2:12-cv-00766-TLN-KJN, 2018 WL 1367451, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018). 
137. See, e.g., Bethea v. Access Bank, No. 8:17CV135, 2018 WL3009114, at *8–9 (D. Neb. June 
15, 2018) (granting summary judgment to the employer because accommodating the plaintiff’s 
request to not work Saturdays would have caused undue hardship, either by requiring the bank to hire 
additional workers or by forcing other employees to work additional shifts); Hill v. Promise Hosp. of 
Phoenix, Inc., No. 09-cv-1958-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2812913, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2010) (granting 
employer’s motion to dismiss, in part because accommodating the plaintiff’s request to not disclose 
his social security number would have caused the employer undue hardship).  
138. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 231 (2000) (explaining 
that “[a]n ‘accommodation mandate’ is a requirement that employers take special steps in response to 
the distinctive needs of particular, identifiable demographic groups of workers”).  
139. See, e.g., Baltgalvis v. Newport News Shipbuilding Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 414, 419–20 (E.D. 
Va. 2001) (granting summary judgment to the employer upon determination that the requested 
accommodation would impose undue hardship). 
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instances where an accommodation would not impose more than de 
minimis cost, the inquiry would not end there. Instead, a court would go 
on to consider whether the accommodation is reasonable from the 
employee’s point of view. 
III. REASONABLENESS FROM THE EMPLOYEE’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
To restore employees’ right to reasonable religious accommodations, 
the first task is to disentangle reasonableness from undue hardship. Unless 
the two are treated as separate and distinct concepts, there is no 
justification for considering how an accommodation impacts the 
employee; the focus would rest entirely on whether it would cause the 
employer undue hardship. This Part shows how the statutory text, 
legislative history, EEOC guidance, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and 
other judicial decisions support the proposition that reasonableness is a 
standalone concept that courts must evaluate from the employee’s point 
of view. 
A. Title VII’s Statutory Text 
It is impossible to discern from Title VII’s text alone what Congress 
meant by “reasonably accommodate.”140 The phrasing of the 
accommodation provision is undoubtedly awkward, perhaps in part 
because of its placement in the statute’s definition of religion rather than 
the more logical “unlawful employment practices” section.141 From a 
linguistic standpoint, the ambiguity stems from the location of the term in 
a phrase that references both the employer’s duties and the employee’s 
religious needs.142 It can be read as requiring an employer to provide an 
accommodation that is reasonable to the employer, meaning one that does 
not cause the employer undue hardship. Or it can be read as requiring an 
employer, in the absence of undue hardship, to provide an accommodation 
that is reasonable to the employee. 
Title VII is not the first statute to contain ambiguous language, and 
courts have developed a number of strategies to discern congressional 
intent when a statute’s language is unclear. One method is to look to the 
canons of statutory construction for assistance in ascertaining a statute’s 
 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
141. Id. § 2000e-2. 
142. Id. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, 
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to 
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on 
the conduct of the employer’s business.”). 
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meaning.143 At least one canon, that “a court should give effect, if 
possible, to every clause or word of a statute,”144 is potentially instructive 
here. This canon “encourages courts to give meaning to every word used 
in a statute to realize congressional intent” based on the assumption “that 
Congress would not have included superfluous language.”145 This canon 
cuts against the notion that reasonableness and undue hardship are a single 
concept. If they were two sides of the same coin, the reasonableness 
qualifier would be redundant and unnecessary since the employer’s 
accommodation duty is already limited by the undue hardship restriction. 
In essence, reasonableness could be removed from the statute without 
changing the employer’s accommodation duty in the slightest—it would 
still hinge on whether the accommodation imposed undue hardship. But 
because “it is a presumption of statutory construction that Congress 
intended every word to have independent meaning,”146 reasonableness 
and undue hardship cannot mean the same thing. If reasonableness has 
any independent meaning, it must be that Congress intended for it to be 
determined from the employee’s point of view.147 
Another technique courts often apply in resolving statutory ambiguities 
is to “consider the interpretation of other statutory provisions that employ 
the same or similar language.”148 The ADA is the most logical starting 
point, as courts have held that it and Title VII should be interpreted 
 
143. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Mia. Seaquarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1147 
(11th Cir. 2018) (“[O]ur authority to interpret statutory language is constrained by the plain meaning 
of the statutory language in the context of the entire statute, as assisted by 
the canons of statutory construction.”). 
144. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 104 (1990).  
145. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 
Bohner v. Burwell, No. 15-4088, 2016 WL 8716339, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2016) (“The [r]ule 
against [s]urplusage, instructs the court to interpret a statute such that each word has meaning; nothing 
is redundant, inoperative, void, or superfluous.” (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 
(2009))). 
146. First Shore Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hudson (In re Hudson), 352 B.R. 391, 393 (Bankr. D. 
Md. 2006). 
147. See Andrew J. Hull, Note, Complete or Partial Accommodation: An Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit Split Over the Duty of the Employer to Reasonably Accommodate the Religious Beliefs of the 
Employee, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 241, 259 (2012) (“While this interpretation [that reasonableness 
should be assessed from the employer’s perspective] is certainly a possible inference from the 
wording of the statute, it is not the most logical. Giving the employer protection in the employee’s 
only provision of protection (reasonable accommodation) is redundant when the employer already 
has its own provision of protection (undue hardship). If reasonableness is also the standard for 
protecting the employer, then it was unnecessary for Congress to include the ‘undue hardship’ 
provision. But the existence of the ‘undue hardship’ provision makes it far more likely that the 
protection of ‘reasonableness’ belongs solely to the employee. This is the position taken by the 
Supreme Court in [Ansonia]. The Supreme Court used the term ‘reasonable’ to determine whether the 
accommodation proposed by the employer subjected the employee to other discrimination.”). 
148. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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consistently whenever possible.149 Like Title VII, the ADA requires 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations in the absence of undue 
hardship,150 and courts have interpreted the two provisions as “nearly 
identical.”151 Although the ADA’s phrasing is slightly different—
requiring “reasonable accommodation . . . unless . . . the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business”152—
reasonableness is no clearer here than in Title VII, leading to judicial 
confusion over whether reasonableness under the ADA is determined 
from the employer’s or the employee’s perspective.153 
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of reasonableness under the 
ADA’s accommodation provision in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.154 When 
Robert Barnett, a cargo handler, injured his back, US Airways 
accommodated his disability by moving him to a less physically 
demanding position in the mailroom.155 His new position later became 
open to seniority-based bidding, and employees senior to him planned on 
bidding for the position.156 US Airways declined Barnett’s request to 
remain in the mailroom as an accommodation and subsequently 
terminated his employment.157 In considering the relationship between 
reasonableness and undue hardship, the Court rejected the notion that the 
former is a “redundant mirror image” of the latter.158 The Court likewise 
disagreed with Barnett’s claim that reasonableness only means the 
effectiveness of an accommodation in meeting an individual’s disability-
based needs.159 The Court explained, “[i]t is the word ‘accommodation,’ 
not the word ‘reasonable,’ that conveys the need for effectiveness. An 
 
149. See cases cited supra note 84. 
150. The ADA defines discrimination to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
151. Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“ADA reasonable 
accommodation claims are nearly identical to the corresponding Title VII section.”); see also 
Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that “Title VII . . . imposes an identical obligation on employers with respect to 
accommodating religion” as the ADA does with accommodating disabilities). 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
153. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, A New Look at the ADA’s Undue Hardship Defense, 84 MO. L. 
REV. 121, 158–64 (2019) (examining ADA cases where courts exhibit confusion over the relationship 
between reasonableness and undue hardship). 
154. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
155. Id. at 394. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 400. 
159. Id. 
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ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will not accommodate a 
disabled individual’s limitations.”160 The Court went on to adopt a two-
part test to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to an accommodation 
under the ADA: the plaintiff must first demonstrate that an 
accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run 
of cases;” to counter this showing, the employer must then prove that 
despite its facial reasonableness, the accommodation would have caused 
it “undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”161 
In terms of its potential application to religious accommodations, 
Barnett is a mixed bag. The questions of whether an accommodation must 
be reasonable to an employee, and if so, what that entails, was not squarely 
before the court. Nevertheless, Barnett does support the view that 
reasonableness and undue hardship are not one and the same.162 And yet, 
the test the Court endorsed considers reasonableness from the employer’s 
perspective, not the employee’s.163 But this does not mean an 
accommodation’s impact on the employee plays no part in the inquiry. 
Regardless of what reasonableness means, an accommodation must 
nonetheless be “effective,” which, at least in the context of the ADA, 
means it must “enable . . . [the] employee to enjoy equal benefits and 
privileges of employment as are enjoyed by . . . other similarly situated 
employees without disabilities.”164 
Although the Supreme Court has never been called upon to decide 
whether Barnett is applicable to religious accommodations, it seems 
unlikely this would happen. Lower courts rarely reference Barnett in 
deciding religious accommodation cases, perhaps because, for all their 
similarities, religious and disability accommodations fundamentally differ 
in terms of what they seek to accomplish. A disability accommodation is 
intended to make a disabled worker the same as others in terms of ability 
to perform the job, whereas a religious accommodation is meant to make 
 
160. Id. (emphasis in original). 
161. Id. at 401–02 (emphasis in original). 
162. Even following Barnett, scholars continue to debate the meaning of reasonableness and undue 
hardship in the ADA context. Mark Weber argues that “reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship are a single concept. The words form parts of a statutory sentence that links them together 
into the same statutory term. The duty to make reasonable accommodations exists up to the limit of 
undue hardship. At the point of undue hardship, the accommodation is no longer reasonable.” Mark 
C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2010). By 
contrast, Nicole Buonocore Porter counters that “there is some limitation to an employer’s obligation 
to provide a reasonable accommodation besides the undue hardship limit. . . . [S]ome 
accommodations are ‘unreasonable’ even though they do not cause an undue hardship to the 
employer.” Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disability Act, 47 GA. 
L. REV. 527, 544–46 (2013). 
163. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02. 
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (2019). 
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a religious adherent different from other employees. Thus, an employer 
considering how to make a disabled worker the same as other employees 
does not have nearly the same motive to punish the accommodation seeker 
as does an employer considering how to make a religious worker different 
from other employees. For this reason, it is more necessary to assess how 
an accommodation affects a religious-accommodation seeker’s terms and 
conditions of employment. 
B. Title VII’s Legislative History 
Title VII’s legislative history is not especially helpful in elucidating 
Congress’s intent behind the statute’s religious discrimination provisions. 
The record corresponding to the religious accommodation amendment is 
especially scant, spanning just two pages of the Congressional Record and 
consisting mostly of a floor debate in which Senator Randolph, the 
amendment’s sponsor, expressed his views on the proposed legislation 
and answered four questions from two senators.165 Nothing in the 
legislative history suggests Congress considered the meaning of 
reasonableness, as the term does not appear anywhere in the record.166 But 
what is clear from the record is that Senator Randolph’s singular focus in 
proposing the amendment was “to assure that freedom from religious 
discrimination in the employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by 
law.”167 He explained how his concern stemmed from the refusal of 
employers to hire or retain workers whose religious beliefs, like his own, 
prohibited them from performing work on their Sabbath.168 In his view, 
“the law flowing from the original Constitution of the United States 
should protect [workers’] religious freedom, and hopefully their 
opportunity to earn a livelihood within the American system . . . .”169 
Senator Randolph was so focused on protecting workers that at no point 
during his speech did he even acknowledge the possibility that an 
accommodation could adversely affect an employer.170 Given his zealous 
 
165. 118 CONG. REC. 705–14 (1972); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 
74–75 & n.9 (1977) (noting the “brief legislative history” of the 1972 Act, “consist[ing] chiefly of a 
brief floor debate in the Senate, contained in less than two pages of the Congressional Record and 
consisting principally of the views of . . . Senator Jennings Randolph,” who “expressed his general 
desire ‘to assure that freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all 
time guaranteed by law,’ but . . . made no attempt to define the precise circumstances under which 
the ‘reasonable accommodation’ requirement would be applied”). 
166. 118 CONG. REC. 705–14 (1972). 
167. Id. at 705. 
168. Id. at 705–06. 
169. Id. at 706. 
170. Id. at 705–06. 
Flake (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:14 PM 
2020] RESTORING REASONABLENESS 1701 
 
advocacy for the religious rights of employees, it is logically consistent 
that by “reasonably accommodate,” Senator Randolph meant an 
accommodation’s reasonableness must be assessed from the employee’s 
point of view. 
There is one other aspect of the legislative history that may shed light 
on what Congress meant by reasonable accommodation. At the conclusion 
of Senator Randolph’s remarks, a fellow senator posed this hypothetical: 
“A young man . . . works 15 days on and then is off 15 days. Would the 
amendment require an employer to change that kind of employment ratio 
around, so that he would have to work a customary 5- or 6-day week?”171 
Senator Randolph replied, “I do not believe that an undue hardship would 
come to such an employer.”172 New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams 
likewise couched the employer’s accommodation duty in terms of undue 
hardship rather than reasonableness during the floor debate, posing the 
question to Senator Randolph: 
[W]here the employment is such that the job has to be done on a 
day that a person under his faith would make his religious 
observations, it might be an undue hardship to close down the 
operation to accommodate that person. . . . Certainly the 
amendment would permit the employer not to hire a person who 
could not work on one of the 2 days of the employment; this 
would be an undue hardship, and the employer’s situation is 
protected under the amendment offered by the Senator from West 
Virginia, is it not?173 
Senator Randolph agreed this would constitute undue hardship.174 
What is noteworthy about his responses is that Senator Randolph did not 
assess the employer’s duty by whether the accommodation would be 
reasonable to the employer but instead by whether it would cause the 
employer undue hardship.175 This further suggests Congress intended for 
an employer’s accommodation duty to be limited solely by undue 
hardship, not by whether the accommodation is reasonable to 
the employer. 
C. EEOC Guidance 
The statutory text and legislative history are somewhat nebulous 
regarding the meaning of reasonable accommodation, but the EEOC 
 
171. Id. at 706. 
172. Id. (emphasis added). 
173. Id. 
174. Id.  
175. Id. 
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guidance is not. In the earliest versions of its federal regulations on 
religious accommodations, which preceded the amendment to Title VII, 
reasonableness seemed tied to the notion of undue hardship. The first 
version of the regulation required employers “to accommodate to the 
reasonable religious needs of employees . . . where such accommodation 
can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the 
business.”176 The placement of “reasonable” directly before “religious 
needs of employees” indicates the EEOC’s view early on was that an 
accommodation had to be reasonable to the employer, not the employee. 
Given that what the EEOC was proposing—an affirmative obligation to 
accommodate—was unprecedented and somewhat radical for its time, it 
is not surprising the agency would attempt to placate employers by 
assuring them they only had to accommodate employees’ religious needs 
that were reasonable. 
The following year, the EEOC made significant changes to the wording 
of the guidelines. The new version explained that employers must “make 
reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of 
employees . . . where such accommodations can be made without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”177 The movement of 
“reasonable” to in front of “accommodations” instead of “religious needs” 
shifted the employer’s duty from one of accommodating “reasonable 
religious needs” to making “reasonable accommodations.” But this was 
likely a distinction without a difference, as the EEOC further explained 
that “the employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship 
renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the 
employee unreasonable.”178 Once again, the concept of reasonableness is 
tied to undue hardship: a reasonable accommodation is one that does not 
cause undue hardship to the employer. 
The EEOC’s view of reasonableness evolved after Congress amended 
Title VII in 1972. Revisions to the federal regulations in 1980 made clear 
the EEOC’s position that an accommodation’s reasonableness should be 
measured by how it impacts the employee.179 The EEOC explained that in 
situations where multiple accommodations are available that would not 
cause undue hardship to the employer, “the Commission will determine 
whether the accommodation offered [was] reasonable” by considering: 
(i) The alternatives for accommodation considered by the 
employer or labor organization; and 
 
176. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (June 15, 1966) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605). 
177. 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (July 13, 1967) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605). 
178. Id. at 10,298–99. 
179. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2) (2019). 
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(ii) The alternatives for accommodation, if any, actually offered 
to the individual requiring accommodation. Some alternatives for 
accommodating religious practices might disadvantage the 
individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities, 
such as compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment. Therefore, when there is more than one means of 
accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the 
employer or labor organization must offer the alternative which 
least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her 
employment opportunities.180 
The EEOC’s position is unequivocal: reasonableness depends on how 
an accommodation impacts the employee—not the employer. The 
regulation seems to acknowledge that an accommodation may be 
reasonable even if it negatively affects the employee’s employment if it is 
the only accommodation available that would not cause the employer 
undue hardship. But where multiple accommodations are available, none 
of which would cause the employer undue hardship, the accommodation 
offered or provided is only reasonable if it is the one that least 
disadvantages the employee’s employment opportunities. This obligates 
employers to not simply provide any accommodation they choose but to 
accommodate employees in the manner that least adversely affects 
their employment. 
The Supreme Court has cast doubt on the EEOC’s position, noting in 
Ansonia that “[t]o the extent that the guideline . . . requires the employer 
to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship, 
we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
statute.”181 But the Court’s characterization of the guideline overlooks the 
nuance of the EEOC’s position. Nowhere in the regulation does the EEOC 
claim employees are entitled to their preferred accommodation. In fact, 
the Commission has explicitly rejected this proposition elsewhere.182 The 
EEOC’s view is that for an accommodation to be reasonable in the first 
 
180. Id. 
181. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 n.6 (1986). 
182. See COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV(A)(3) (“Where there is more than one 
reasonable accommodation that would not pose an undue hardship, the employer is not obliged to 
provide the accommodation preferred by the employee.”). The EEOC illustrates this position using 
the following example:  
Tina, a newly hired part-time store cashier whose sincerely held religious belief is that she should 
refrain from work on Sunday as part of her Sabbath observance, asked her supervisor never to 
schedule her to work on Sundays. Tina specifically asked to be scheduled to work Saturdays 
instead. In response, her employer offered to allow her to work on Thursday, which she found 
inconvenient because she takes a college class on that day. Even if Tina preferred a different 
schedule, the employer is not required to grant Tina’s preferred accommodation.  
Id.  
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place, it must be less burdensome to the employee than any available 
alternative.183 Thus, an employer’s obligation to provide the least 
disadvantageous accommodation is not a matter of preference but 
of reasonableness. 
Rather than alter its guidance in light of Ansonia’s rebuke, the EEOC 
has doubled down, explaining in its Compliance Manual: 
Although an employer never has to provide an accommodation 
that would pose an undue hardship, . . . the accommodation that 
is provided must be a reasonable one. An accommodation is not 
reasonable if it merely lessens rather than eliminates the conflict 
between religion and work, provided eliminating the conflict 
would not impose an undue hardship. Eliminating the conflict 
between a work rule and an employee’s religious belief, practice, 
or observance means accommodating the employee without 
unnecessarily disadvantaging the employee’s terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment. 
Where there is more than one reasonable accommodation that 
would not pose an undue hardship, the employer is not obliged to 
provide the accommodation preferred by the employee. However, 
an employer’s proposed accommodation will not be reasonable if 
a more favorable accommodation is provided to other employees 
for non-religious purposes, or, for example, if it requires the 
employee to accept a reduction in pay rate or some other loss of a 
benefit or privilege of employment and there is an alternative 
accommodation that does not do so. 
Ultimately, reasonableness is a fact-specific determination. The 
reasonableness of an employer’s attempt at accommodation 
cannot be determined in a vacuum. Instead, it must be determined 
on a case‑by‑case basis; what may be a reasonable 
accommodation for one employee may not be reasonable for 
another . . . . The term reasonable accommodation is a relative 
term and cannot be given a hard and fast meaning; each 
case . . . necessarily depends upon its own facts and 
circumstances, and comes down to a determination of 
reasonableness under the unique circumstances of the individual 
employer-employee relationship.184 
To the EEOC, reasonableness and undue hardship are separate 
inquiries, with the former being assessed from the employee’s perspective 
and the latter from the employer’s point of view. The EEOC’s current 
stance, which has evolved significantly from its initial position, is that an 
 
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2).  
184. Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 
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accommodation is reasonable only if it fully eliminates the conflict 
between the employee’s job and religious beliefs and is the least 
burdensome option available to the employee. 
D. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed if and how 
reasonableness differs from undue hardship in the religious 
accommodation context, its jurisprudence supports the notion that these 
terms have distinct and independent meanings. While Hardison is best 
known for its definition of undue hardship, it also offers a glimpse into 
the Supreme Court’s understanding of the relationship between 
reasonableness and undue hardship.185 The Court explained that Title VII 
requires “an employer, short of ‘undue hardship,’ to make ‘reasonable 
accommodations’ to the religious needs of its employees.”186 This 
suggests the Court saw reasonableness and undue hardship as distinct 
concepts since it recognized an employer must make a reasonable 
accommodation when undue hardship is not present. Because the Court 
found that accommodating Hardison would cause TWA undue 
hardship,187 it did not expound on what makes an accommodation 
reasonable, nor did it offer any guidance as to whether reasonableness 
should be evaluated from the perspective of the employer or the employee. 
Justice Marshall hinted in his dissent that reasonableness differs from 
undue hardship and should be evaluated from the employee’s 
perspective.188 He explained that certain accommodations Hardison 
proposed “would have disadvantaged [him] to some extent, but since he 
suggested both options” it was unnecessary to “consider whether an 
employer would satisfy his duty to accommodate by offering these 
choices to an unwilling employee.”189 Thus, Justice Marshall was not only 
concerned by how an accommodation would affect the employer but also 
by how it would impact the employee. Although the facts of the case did 
not allow him to fully explore this question, he seemed to be setting the 
stage for another day. 
Ansonia provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the 
reasonableness question that eluded it in Hardison.190 As previously 
discussed, the Court rejected the notion an accommodation is per se 
 
185. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
186. Id. at 66. 
187. Id. at 77.  
188. Id. at 96 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
189. Id. 
190. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
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reasonable if it allows the employer to keep his job and practice his 
faith.191 Remaining employed is necessary but insufficient for an 
accommodation to be reasonable. The Court explained that aside from the 
fact that the school board’s unpaid leave policy eliminated the conflict 
between Philbrook’s job and his religious beliefs, the accommodation was 
reasonable because it had “no direct effect upon either employment 
opportunities or job status,” as it appeared he would not be compensated 
for just three of his absences each year.192 This indicates that if the 
accommodation had affected Philbrook’s employment opportunities or 
job status, it may not have been reasonable. 
Ansonia provided Justice Marshall the opportunity to expound further 
on the concept of reasonableness. He agreed with the majority that if an 
employer offers an accommodation that “fully resolves the conflict 
between” the employee’s job and religion, it normally has no duty to 
consider the employee’s preferred accommodation.193 But if the 
employer’s proposed accommodation fails to fully resolve the conflict, he 
argued, the employer must consider whatever reasonable proposal the 
employee submits.194 Justice Marshall disagreed that the school board’s 
policy fully resolved the conflict between Philbrook’s job and religion.195 
Although it allowed him to keep his job despite missing work for religious 
holidays, Philbrook nonetheless was “force[d] . . . to choose between 
following his religious precepts with a partial forfeiture of salary and 
violating these precepts for work with full pay.”196 Because “[a] forced 
reduction in compensation based on an employee’s religious beliefs can 
be . . . a violation of Title VII,” Justice Marshall reasoned, Philbrook was 
entitled “to further accommodation, if reasonably possible without undue 
hardship to the school board’s educational program.”197 He further 
explained that although “unpaid leave will generally amount to a 
reasonable accommodation, . . . this does not mean that unpaid leave will 
always be the reasonable accommodation which best resolves the conflict 
between the needs of the employer and employee.”198 In his view, if an 
employee offers another reasonable proposal that results in a more 
effective resolution for the employee without causing undue hardship to 
 
191. See supra section II.B.  
192. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 60. 
193. Id. at 72–73 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted). 
194. Id. at 73. 
195. Id. at 74. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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the employer, the employer should be required to implement it.199 Justice 
Marshall thus would have remanded the case for factual findings on “the 
reasonableness and expected hardship of Philbrook’s proposals.”200 
Taken together, Hardison and Ansonia support the view that 
reasonableness and undue hardship are analytically distinct. In Hardison, 
the Court focused on how the proposed accommodations would have 
impacted the employer.201 It rightly couched its analysis in terms of undue 
hardship because its concern centered on the burden the employer would 
have suffered if required to accommodate the employee.202 The Court did 
not address the question of reasonableness, not because the presence of 
undue hardship rendered the accommodations unreasonable but because 
the accommodations failed to clear this first hurdle. Whether the 
accommodations were reasonable to Hardison was of no import because 
each would have imposed undue hardship on the employer. By contrast, 
Ansonia makes almost no mention of undue hardship; the Court’s focus 
was not on how the school board would have been affected through the 
proposed accommodations but on how Philbrook would be impacted by 
the board’s offer of unpaid leave.203 Thus, the Court appropriately 
centered its analysis on the question of reasonableness rather than undue 
hardship. If reasonableness and undue hardship were two sides of the 
same coin, the Ansonia Court would have had no need to consider how 
the accommodation impacted Philbrook. It would have instead focused on 
whether the accommodation would cause the school board undue 
hardship. The fact that it considered the accommodation’s impact on 
Philbrook—with no mention of undue hardship—supports the view that 
reasonableness and undue hardship are distinct concepts requiring 
distinct analyses. 
E. Lower Court Decisions 
A number of appellate courts have acknowledged the need to evaluate 
an accommodation from the employee’s perspective. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was the first to take this position. In American Postal 
Workers Union, San Francisco Local v. Postmaster General,204 two postal 
service window clerks who objected on religious grounds to processing 
draft registration forms sued the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) for failing to 
 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 60 (majority opinion).  
201. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77–85 (1977). 
202. Id. 
203. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70. 
204. 781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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accommodate their request to refer draft registrants to another window 
clerk.205 USPS only offered to allow the clerks to transfer to a different 
position that did not require them to process registration forms.206 This 
frustrated the clerks because they felt a transfer “would place them in a 
less attractive employment status.”207 The district court concluded the 
transfer offer removed the religious conflict facing the clerks but did not 
consider how it would impact their employment beyond that.208 The Ninth 
Circuit held this was an error, explaining that Title VII “requires an 
employer to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee in a 
manner which will reasonably preserve that employee’s employment 
status, i.e., compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.”209 The court viewed the reasonableness inquiry as two-
pronged: first, the accommodation must eliminate the religious conflict; 
and second, it must reasonably preserve the affected employee’s 
employment status.210 The court remanded the case “to determine whether 
the accommodation proposed by the Postal Service reasonably preserved 
the employment status” of the clerks.211 
The Sixth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead. In Cooper v. Oak 
Rubber Co.,212 the court held that a scheduling accommodation that would 
have required the employee to use all of her vacation days was not a 
reasonable accommodation even though it technically would have 
eliminated the conflict between her job and her religion.213 The court 
acknowledged that requiring an employee to use a portion of her vacation 
entitlement “may be reasonable” under appropriate circumstances.214 But 
forcing the employee to use all of her vacation leave was unreasonable 
because the “employee stands to lose a benefit, vacation time, enjoyed by 
 
205. Id. at 774. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 776. 
208. Id. at 777. 
209. Id. at 776 (emphasis added).  
210. Id. at 776–77 (“Where an employer proposes an accommodation which effectively eliminates 
the religious conflict faced by a particular employee, however, the inquiry under Title VII reduces to 
whether the accommodation reasonably preserves the affected employee’s employment status.”). The 
Ninth Circuit applied this same test in Kelly v. County of Orange, where it concluded a job transfer 
eliminated the conflict between the employee’s job and religion and reasonably preserved the terms 
and conditions of her employment because she retained her job title, received a pay increase, requested 
and received a decrease in hours, and “her new job was appropriate for a nurse with some degree of 
experience and training.” 101 F. App’x 206, 207 (9th Cir. 2004). 
211. APWU, 781 F.2d at 777.  
212. 15 F.3d 1375 (6th Cir. 1994). 
213. Id. at 1379. 
214. Id. 
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all other employees who do not share the same religious conflict, and is 
thus discriminated against with respect to a privilege of employment.”215 
In Cosme v. Henderson,216 the Second Circuit assessed the 
reasonableness of USPS’s offers to accommodate a letter carrier who 
could not work Saturdays for religious reasons by allowing him to remain 
an “unassigned regular” employee or to transfer to any of three different 
Manhattan locations where he would not have to work Saturdays.217 
Citing to Ansonia, the court explained that even though these offers 
eliminated the conflict between the employee’s work and religion, the 
proposed accommodation “might still have been unreasonable if it caused 
Cosme to suffer an inexplicable diminution in his employee status or 
benefits. In other words, an accommodation might be unreasonable if it 
imposes a significant work-related burden on the employee without 
justification . . . .”218 The court concluded that the accommodations 
offered were reasonable because the employee had not proven he would 
suffer any prejudice if he remained an unassigned regular: he would be 
assigned tasks appropriate for a letter carrier, his pay rate would remain 
the same, and although he would have temporarily lost his seniority for 
ninety days had he transferred locations, there was no evidence this would 
have adversely affected his employment.219 
The Seventh Circuit has likewise recognized that an accommodation’s 
reasonableness depends on how it affects the employee. In Porter v. City 
of Chicago,220 an employee requested Sundays off to attend morning 
church services.221 The Seventh Circuit rejected the employee’s claim that 
her employer’s offer to allow her to switch to a later shift on Sundays was 
an unreasonable accommodation, citing one of its prior decisions for the 
proposition that “it is a reasonable accommodation to permit an employee 
to exercise the right to seek job transfers or shift changes, particularly 
when such changes do not reduce pay or cause loss of benefits.”222 The 
court concluded that because the employee’s objection to the shift change 
was not based on any decrease in her pay or benefits but was instead 
simply a matter of preference, the accommodation was reasonable.223 Had 
the accommodation resulted in a pay decrease, the outcome may have 
 
215. Id. 
216. 287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2002). 
217. Id. at 155. 
218. Id. at 159–60 (citation omitted). 
219. Id. at 159–61. 
220. 700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012). 
221. Id. at 949. 
222. Id. at 952 (quoting Rodriguez v. City of Chi., 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
223. Id. 
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been different. The court warned that “[h]ad changing watch groups 
affected Porter’s pay or other benefits, a much more rigorous inquiry 
would be required,” but it did not explain what such inquiry 
would entail.224 
Several district courts have followed these appellate courts’ lead in 
evaluating reasonableness from the employee’s perspective.225 For 
example, in O’Barr v. UPS, Inc.,226 UPS offered a mechanic who 
requested Saturdays off a part-time position as a preloader that would 
have eliminated the conflict with his observance of the Sabbath.227 This 
was an entry-level position that did not involve use of his mechanic skills, 
which meant a loss of seniority, a reduction in benefits, and a pay decrease 
from $30.25 per hour to $9.50 per hour.228 The court denied UPS summary 
judgment, explaining that “[t]he focus of the inquiry as to what type of 
accommodation is ‘reasonable’ is on whether the accommodation 
preserves the employee’s terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment, once the employer has eliminated the religious conflict with 
the employee’s requirements.”229 Because the part-time position would 
have resulted in a loss of pay and reduction in other benefits, a factual 
dispute remained as to whether the accommodation was reasonable under 
 
224. Id.  
225. See, e.g., Farah v. A-1 Careers, No. 12-2692-SAC, 2013 WL 6095118, at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 
20, 2013) (“Eliminating the conflict between a work rule and an employee’s religious belief, practice, 
or observance means accommodating the employee without unnecessarily disadvantaging the 
employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (quoting COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra 
note 92, § 12-IV)); Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, No. 08-CV-4094 (DLI)(LB), 2012 WL 3645776, at 
*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012) (acknowledging that “an accommodation could be unreasonable if it 
would cause an ‘inexplicable diminution’ in an employee’s status or benefits,” but holding the 
plaintiff could not establish such a diminution based on his conclusory assertions that the 
accommodation would affect how his employer perceived him); Tomasino v. St. John’s Univ., 
No. 08-CV-2059 (JG)(ALC), 2010 WL 3721047, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010) (holding that the 
employer’s accommodation of the employee’s request to participate in noontime mass by requiring 
her to take her paid lunch break at 11:15 a.m. was reasonable as a matter of law because such 
arrangement had no direct effect upon either her employment opportunities or job status); Winbush 
v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 4:06-cv-00525, 2008 WL 11422562, at *7 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 29, 
2008) (granting the employer summary judgment where accommodating the employee’s request to 
attend religious classes by allowing her to take unpaid time off for approximately three hours per 
week did not adversely affect her employment opportunities or job status); Reed v. UAW, 523 F. 
Supp. 2d 592, 600–01 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that the employer’s offer to accommodate an 
employee who objected to paying union dues on religious grounds by allowing him to pay an 
equivalent amount to a charity was reasonable as a matter of law because it did not result in the loss 
of any employment benefits). 
226. No. 3:11-CV-177, 2013 WL 2243004 (E.D. Tenn. May 21, 2013). 
227. Id. at *1–3. 
228. Id. at *5. 
229. Id. (quoting Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 599). 
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the circumstances of the case.230 
Similarly, in Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Wireless,231 an installation 
technician who converted to the Seventh Day Adventist faith sued his 
employer for failing to accommodate his request for Saturdays off.232 
AT&T offered to allow him to transfer to a sales position or, alternatively, 
to ask other technicians to voluntarily swap shifts with him.233 In 
considering the reasonableness of these accommodations, the court was 
sensitive to how they would impact the employee’s employment. Citing 
American Postal Workers Union and Cosme, it acknowledged “a 
reasonable accommodation may require that a company ‘reasonably 
preserve that employee’s employment status,’” and further noted that 
“[b]ased on its independent review of Title VII’s statutory provisions and 
existing case law, . . . reasonable preservation of compensation . . . [is] a 
significant aspect of a reasonable accommodation.”234 The court 
concluded there was an issue of fact as to whether the job transfer 
constituted a reasonable accommodation because it would have reduced 
the plaintiff’s annual earnings from approximately $38,000 to $23,000.235 
The court nonetheless granted AT&T summary judgment because it 
determined the company’s offer to allow the employee to swap shifts with 
coworkers, coupled with its willingness to provide him with their work 
schedules and to advertise his need, constituted a 
reasonable accommodation.236 
These cases make clear there is judicial support for the notion that 
reasonableness is a separate requirement from undue hardship, and that it 
should be assessed from the employee’s perspective. If an accommodation 
only had to be reasonable to the employer, these courts would have had 
no reason to consider the impact of an accommodation on an employee’s 
wages, vacation benefits, or any other term or condition of employment. 
Instead, they would have only assessed whether the accommodation 
would cause undue hardship to the employer. That each of these courts 
evaluated reasonableness separate and apart from undue hardship, by 
considering how the accommodation would affect the employee’s 
employment opportunities or job status, indicates at least some courts 
consider this a necessary factor in determining whether an employer has 
satisfied its duty to accommodate. 
 
230. Id. at *6. 
231. 728 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.P.R. 2010). 
232. Id. at 31–32. 
233. Id. at 36–37. 
234. Id. at 41 (citations omitted). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 41–42. 
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In sum, the proposition that a religious accommodation must be 
reasonable to the employee finds support in several diverse sources. From 
a textual standpoint, including both reasonableness and undue hardship 
limitations in Title VII’s religious accommodation provision would be 
redundant if both were to be assessed solely from the employer’s 
perspective. The legislative history likewise supports this position, as it 
reflects an unequivocal intent by Congress to protect employees from 
suffering adverse employment consequences because of their religious 
beliefs and exclusively couches the employer’s burden in terms of undue 
hardship rather than unreasonableness. The EEOC has long interpreted 
reasonableness as distinct from undue hardship and has explained that 
reasonableness is dependent on how an accommodation impacts the 
employee. The Supreme Court has signaled its agreement with this 
position, holding in Ansonia that the accommodation was reasonable 
because it both eliminated the conflict and had no direct effect on the 
employee’s employment opportunities or job status. Several lower courts, 
including four federal courts of appeals and numerous district courts, have 
acknowledged the need to assess how an accommodation would impact 
the employee, independent from its effect on the employer. 
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING REASONABLENESS 
Having made the case that reasonableness is distinct from undue 
hardship and must be evaluated from the employee’s perspective, this Part 
turns to the question of how to determine whether an accommodation 
would be reasonable to the employee. It proposes three requirements: 
(1) the accommodation must fully eliminate the conflict between the 
employee’s job and religious beliefs, (2) the accommodation cannot cause 
the employee to suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) the 
accommodation must not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s 
terms or conditions of employment. This Part also considers how religious 
accommodations would be impacted if this conceptualization of 
reasonableness is adopted. 
A. A Reasonable Accommodation Must Eliminate the Employee’s 
Work-Religion Conflict 
A threshold requirement for any accommodation to be reasonable is 
that it must fully eliminate the conflict between the employee’s job and 
religious beliefs.237 This means the employer must accommodate the 
 
237. See Zaheer, supra note 6, at 513 (arguing that “[a]n employer can easily devise any number 
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employee in a way that allows the employee to fully observe his religious 
convictions without losing his job. For example, if a Latter-day Saint 
employee believes it is a sin to work on Sundays, a reasonable 
accommodation would require the employer to give the employee the 
entire day off. Scheduling the employee for a later shift so he can attend 
morning church services or allowing him to work from home would be 
unreasonable because the employee would still be forced to work on 
Sundays in violation of his religious convictions. 
Full accommodation does not require the employer to guarantee that 
there will never be a conflict between an employee’s job and religion. It 
simply requires the employer to ensure that the employee will not face 
such a conflict in situations where it can accommodate the employee 
without undue hardship. In the case of the employee who believes it is a 
sin to work on Sundays, full accommodation would not require the 
employer to ensure the employee will never have to work a Sunday but 
only that the employee will not have to work those Sundays when his 
absence would not cause the employer undue hardship. For example, if 
Super Bowl Sunday is the busiest day of the year for the business, such 
that all employees are required to work, the employer would have no duty 
to accommodate the employee that day. Thus, an employer’s duty to 
accommodate is always limited by whether the accommodation would 
cause the employer undue hardship—an inquiry an employer does not 
make just once but may revisit as circumstances change. Full 
accommodation does not mean insulating an employee from religious 
conflict in every conceivable scenario but only in those instances where 
the employer could accommodate the employee without undue hardship. 
Likewise, full accommodation does not mean an employee will not 
suffer any adverse consequence as a result of the accommodation. As the 
next two sections discuss, limited adverse consequences may be 
permissible. However, any consequences must be work-based rather than 
religious, for “once a court holds that an accommodation is reasonable 
even if it requires an employee to compromise on his religious beliefs, 
that court is in fact stating that religion is a mutable characteristic that an 
individual can choose to follow or dismiss at will.”238 Thus, an employee 
 
of ‘accommodations’ that at least superficially eliminate the employee’s religious conflict but in 
actuality still leave the employee with a difficult choice between religious duty and work obligations,” 
and that “[u]ntil an accommodation ‘fully resolves the conflict between the employee’s work and 
religious requirements’ or at least mostly resolves the conflict, the accommodation is of little use to 
an employee” (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 72–73 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original))). 
238. Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII’s Failure 
to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 464 (2010) (arguing 
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may, within reason, experience limited adverse consequences such as 
reduced wages as a result of an accommodation, but the employee cannot 
be required to compromise his religious beliefs. 
Returning to the employee who believes it is a sin to work on Sundays, 
fully accommodating him does not require the employer to pay him for 
time not worked so he avoids any adverse consequence of the 
accommodation. Assuming the employer is unable to allow the employee 
to make up the lost time by working an extra shift, giving the employee 
the day off without pay would likely constitute a full accommodation 
because the consequence he suffers—not receiving wages for time not 
worked—affects his work, not his religion. By contrast, if the employer 
attempted to accommodate the employee by switching him to a later shift 
on Sundays, this would only be a partial, and thus unreasonable, 
accommodation because the consequence of the accommodation would 
be religious rather than work-based since he would be forced to 
compromise his religious beliefs by still having to work on Sundays. 
The requirement of full accommodation finds support in the definition 
of accommodation itself. Black’s Law Dictionary defines accommodation 
as “[t]he act or an instance of making a change or provision for someone 
or something; an adaptation or adjustment.”239 “Adapt” means “to make 
fit . . . often by modification,”240 and “adjust” means “to bring to a more 
satisfactory state: (1) settle, resolve, (2) rectify, to make correspondent or 
conformable.”241 Kurtz and Sleeper argue  
[t]hese definitions lead to the conclusion that the statute’s use of 
“accommodate” obliges employers to meet the needs of the 
employees’ religious convictions. The plain meaning of the 
phrases, and synonyms used in the definitions . . . all indicate that 
the accommodation must eliminate the conflict between work 
and religion.242  
Moreover, in Ansonia, the Supreme Court equated the term “reasonable 
accommodation” with the “acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the 
 
that the accommodation in Ansonia was reasonable because Philbrook was not forced to compromise 
his religious beliefs, “[r]ather, the compromise he was required to make was purely secular—lost 
pay”). 
239. Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 6–7 (11th ed. 2019). 
240. Adapt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adapt 
[https://perma.cc/R29M-S6NJ]. 
241. Adjust, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adjust 
[https://perma.cc/UF4T-WGC7]. 
242. Janell M. Kurtz & Bradley J. Sleeper, Religion vs. Work: Can Accommodation Fail to 
Accommodate?, 23 MIDWEST L.J. 75, 89 (2009). 
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employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.”243 
Thus, “[b]y definition, any arrangement that does not allow both parties 
to achieve their basic objectives—the employee’s desire to fulfill his 
religious duty and the employer’s desire to accomplish the work he needs 
to get done—does not successfully ‘reconcile’ these competing objectives 
or values.”244 
The requirement of full accommodation is also consistent with 
legislative intent, as well as both the Supreme Court’s and EEOC’s 
interpretations of the Title VII’s religious accommodation provision. 
Senator Randolph proposed the legislation primarily to protect 
Sabbatarians like himself from being forced to work on their day of rest.245 
The only way to accomplish this is by fully exempting an employee from 
work. Partial accommodation would not suffice because the employee 
would still be compelled to choose between their job and their religious 
beliefs. The Supreme Court reached this same conclusion in Ansonia, 
explaining that the accommodation was reasonable, in part, because it 
“eliminate[d] the conflict between employment requirements and 
religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious 
holy days and require[d] him only to give up compensation for a day that 
he did not in fact work.”246 The EEOC has taken an even more aggressive 
stance, proclaiming that “[a]n accommodation is not ‘reasonable’ if it 
merely lessens rather than eliminates the conflict between religion and 
work, provided eliminating the conflict would not impose an 
undue hardship.”247 
In short, reasonable accommodation requires, at a minimum, that the 
employer accommodate the employee in a way that fully eliminates the 
conflict between the employee’s job and religious beliefs. Full 
accommodation does not mean permanent accommodation—an employer 
is free to revisit whether an accommodation would impose undue hardship 
whenever circumstances change. Nor does full accommodation require an 
employer to insulate the employee from any adverse effect, so long as the 
consequence is work-based rather than religious. While more should be 
required to make an accommodation reasonable, as the next two sections 
explain, fully eliminating the conflict between an employee’s job and 
religion is an important starting point. 
 
243. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. 
Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145–46 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
244. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 37, Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544 (10th Cir. 
2018) (No. 16-4135), 2016 WL 6092230 (emphasis in original). 
245. See Kaminer, supra note 29, at 584. 
246. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added). 
247. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV(A)(3). 
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B. A Reasonable Accommodation Must Not Result in an Adverse 
Employment Action 
A second requirement for an accommodation to be reasonable is that it 
must not cause the employee to suffer an adverse employment action. 
Only discrimination that results in an adverse employment action is 
actionable under Title VII.248 The statute does not define “adverse 
employment action,” and there is some disagreement among the courts as 
to the types of actions that qualify.249 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have 
adopted the most restrictive test, holding that only “ultimate employment 
actions” such as hiring, firing, demoting, and promoting constitute 
adverse employment actions.250 The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits take a more expansive view, recognizing actions such 
as unwarranted negative performance evaluations, taking away lunch 
breaks, and moving an employee to a less desirable workspace as adverse 
employment actions.251 The Second and Third Circuits take an 
intermediate position, holding that an adverse action is something that 
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment.252 
Regardless of how the term is defined, an accommodation that causes 
an employee to suffer an adverse employment action cannot be reasonable 
for the simple reason that such an accommodation would itself constitute 
 
248. See Braxton v. Nortek Air Sols., LLC, 769 F. App’x 600, 603 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that a 
Title VII plaintiff must prove he suffered an adverse employment action); Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 106 
F. App’x 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A title VII plaintiff may recover only if the challenged 
employment decision rises to the level of an ‘adverse employment action . . . .’” (quoting Mattern v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997))). 
249. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–42 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing circuit split on 
what constitutes an adverse employment action). 
250. Morris v. Baton Rouge City Constable’s Off., 761 F. App’x 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2019) (“For 
purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim, ‘[a]dverse employment actions include only ultimate 
employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.’” 
(quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam))); Ledergerber 
v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Title VII claim because “[w]hile the action 
complained of may have had a tangential effect on [the plaintiff’s] employment, it did not rise to the 
level of an ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII”). 
251. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242 (first citing Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994); then 
citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996); then citing Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. 
Grp., 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996); then citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 
1996); then citing Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998); and then citing 
Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
252. See Rodriguez-Coss v. Barr, 776 F. App’x 717, 718 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that a Title VII 
plaintiff must show she “suffered an adverse employment action, defined as a ‘materially adverse 
change in the terms and conditions of employment’” (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015))); Paradisis v. Englewood Hosp. Med. Ctr., 680 F. App’x 131, 
136 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because the 
employer’s action “had no impact on the terms of [the plaintiff’s] employment”). 
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impermissible discrimination because the employer would be taking such 
action because of religion—a violation of Title VII in and of itself.253 
Suppose a grocery store clerk requests for religious reasons to be excused 
from selling pornographic magazines to customers, and the employer 
responds by demoting the employee to a custodial position that pays one-
third of the employee’s hourly rate. Despite technically eliminating the 
conflict between the employee’s job and religious convictions, the 
accommodation would be unreasonable because it would cause the 
employee to suffer an adverse employment action. Although the employee 
triggered the discrimination and therefore brought it upon herself by 
requesting an accommodation, this does not change the fact she suffered 
an adverse employment action because of her religion. 
By contrast, an accommodation that negatively impacts the terms or 
conditions of an employee’s employment but does not rise to the level of 
an adverse employment action could potentially constitute a reasonable 
accommodation. Suppose a customer service representative asserts a 
religious objection to her employer’s requirement that she receive a flu 
shot. Requiring the worker to wear a paper mask over her face may 
amount to a reasonable accommodation, both because it would eliminate 
the conflict by allowing the employee to keep her job and practice her 
religion, and because the consequence the employee would experience, 
though perhaps unpleasant, would not rise to the level of an adverse 
employment action.254 Similarly, an accommodation that requires an 
employee like Philbrook to take unpaid leave to observe holy days would 
ordinarily be reasonable even though the employee receives a smaller 
paycheck because, as the Supreme Court pointed out, the employee is 
merely not being paid for time not worked.255 
The requirement that an accommodation not cause an adverse 
employment action may seem so obvious it is unnecessary to include it as 
a component of reasonable accommodation. But in reality, most courts 
have not recognized this requirement, at least explicitly, and without it an 
employer would be free to fashion any accommodation it wishes no matter 
how onerous the consequences, so long as the employee remains 
employed. Ensuring an employee does not suffer an adverse employment 
action in the course of accommodation is thus essential to the concept 
 
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s . . . religion.”). 
254. See Rene F. Najera & Dorit R. Reiss, First Do No Harm: Protecting Patients Through 
Immunizing Health Care Workers, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 363, 387 (2016) (suggesting that requiring 
an employee to wear a mask would be a reasonable accommodation). 
255. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). 
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of reasonableness. 
C. A Reasonable Accommodation Must Not Unnecessarily 
Disadvantage the Employee 
The final requirement for an accommodation to be reasonable is that it 
must not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s terms or conditions 
of employment. This means the employer must select the method of 
accommodation that least burdens the employee’s employment without 
causing the employer undue hardship. Suppose a restaurant server 
requests to no longer work evening shifts so she can attend religious 
services. The employer has openings on its morning and afternoon shifts 
and could move the server to either shift without undue hardship. The 
employee requests the morning shift because the tip amounts she would 
earn in the mornings would be comparable to what she earned in the 
evenings, whereas she would earn considerably fewer tips on the 
afternoon shift. If the employer transfers the employee to the afternoon 
shift, when it could have moved her to the morning shift without undue 
hardship, the accommodation would be unreasonable because it would 
unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s employment by causing a 
reduction in her wages that was avoidable. 
This requirement is consistent with the EEOC’s interpretation of 
reasonable accommodation. When the EEOC updated the federal 
regulations in 1980, it included a provision asserting that it would 
determine the reasonableness of an accommodation by considering the 
alternatives for accommodation considered by the employer and offered 
to the employee.256 Recognizing that “[s]ome alternatives . . . might 
disadvantage the individual with respect to his or her employment 
opportunities,” the EEOC explained that “when there is more than one 
means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the 
employer or labor organization must offer the alternative which least 
disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment 
opportunities.”257 The EEOC reaffirmed this position in its Compliance 
Manual, explaining that reasonable accommodation “means 
accommodating the employee without unnecessarily disadvantaging the 
employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” and warning 
that “an employer’s proposed accommodation will not be 
‘reasonable’ . . . if it requires the employee to accept a reduction in pay 
rate or some other loss of a benefit or privilege of employment and there 
 
256. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (2019). 
257. Id. 
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is an alternative accommodation that does not do so.”258 
Requiring an employer to not unnecessarily disadvantage an 
accommodation seeker is not the same as mandating that an employer 
provide the accommodation seeker’s preferred accommodation. The 
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the latter in Ansonia, and in doing so 
noted that “[t]o the extent that the [EEOC] guideline . . . requires the 
employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of 
undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain 
meaning of the statute.”259 This does not mean the Supreme Court opposed 
the EEOC’s view that a reasonable accommodation must not 
unnecessarily disadvantage the employee. The EEOC has since explained 
that “[t]he Commission’s guidelines do not require an employer to accept 
any alternative favored by the employee, and, thus, are not inconsistent 
with Ansonia.”260 The Commission has further noted that “the Court in 
Ansonia recognized that the limitation in the Commission’s guidelines—
that alternatives must be considered if they will not ‘disadvantage an 
individual’s employment opportunities’—distinguished the 
Commission’s position from the position of the Second Circuit that was 
rejected in Ansonia.”261 While it is true that in most cases employees will 
prefer the accommodation option that least disadvantages their 
employment, the concepts of unnecessary disadvantage and preference 
are analytically distinct. The reasonableness inquiry focuses on how an 
accommodation affects an employee’s employment relative to the 
alternatives—not the employee’s preference. 
Requiring employers to provide the least burdensome accommodation 
would extend meaningful protection to accommodation seekers at little or 
no cost to employers. Because an employer never has to provide an 
accommodation that would cause it more than a de minimis burden, 
requiring the employer to provide one type of accommodation that 
essentially costs it nothing instead of another accommodation that would 
likewise cost it nothing should make little, if any, difference to the 
employer. Either way, the employer is protected from incurring virtually 
any hardship. While this would result in employers sometimes having less 
say over how employees are accommodated because they would be 
required to select the least disadvantageous accommodation, the deck 
remains stacked so heavily in favor of employers that even with this added 
requirement they would continue to wield significant control over the 
 
258. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV.A.3. 
259. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69 n.6. 
260. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 92, § 12-IV.A.3 n.133. 
261. Id. 
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religious accommodation process. 
D. Potential Implications 
This Article argues for the restoration of reasonableness to workplace 
religious accommodations. The goal is to realign religious 
accommodation jurisprudence with congressional intent that in the 
absence of undue hardship, employers should provide employees with 
accommodations that protect them from having to make the “cruel choice” 
between their jobs and their religious convictions.262 Accommodations 
that merely allow employees to keep their jobs but adversely impact their 
employment in other ways may force employees into the precise dilemma 
Congress sought to prevent. Requiring accommodations that fully 
eliminate the work-religion conflict, do not result in adverse employment 
action, and do not unnecessarily disadvantage the accommodation 
seeker’s terms or conditions of employment is a potentially powerful way 
to ensure employees are not needlessly forced to choose between their 
jobs and their religious beliefs. 
Accommodation seekers certainly stand to benefit the most from this 
proposal. The likelihood of receiving an accommodation probably would 
not increase, since employers would still hold the ultimate trump card—
undue hardship—allowing them to continue denying most 
accommodation requests. Yet the quality of accommodations would 
improve in many instances. This proposal would end the practice of partial 
accommodation, as employers could no longer offer accommodations that 
do not fully eliminate the conflict between an employee’s job and 
religious beliefs. It would likewise guarantee an employee would not 
suffer an adverse employment action, such as a demotion or substantial 
pay decrease, because of an accommodation. And although employees 
would not be entitled to their preferred accommodations, they could rest 
assured that employers that can accommodate them without undue 
hardship must provide accommodations that do not unnecessarily 
disadvantage their terms or conditions of employment. Taken together, 
these requirements would offer meaningful protection to accommodation 
seekers that would allow them to adhere to their religious beliefs while 
reasonably preserving their employment status. 
As beneficial as this proposal may be for employees, there is some risk 
it might actually result in fewer accommodations. By raising the bar for 
reasonableness, it may become even easier for an employer to claim undue 
hardship. For instance, an employer may not be able to give an employee 
who believes it is a sin to work on Sundays the entire day off without 
 
262. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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undue hardship but may be able to allow the employee to work a shorter 
shift in order to at least attend church services on Sunday mornings. Under 
this proposal, the accommodation the employer could offer would only 
partially eliminate the work-religion conflict and therefore would not be 
reasonable. Because the employer could not provide an accommodation 
that meets this heightened standard for reasonableness without suffering 
undue hardship itself, it may choose instead not to offer any 
accommodation at all, arguably leaving the employee worse off because 
he would not even get Sunday mornings off. 
There are at least three responses to this concern. First, for many 
religious workers, adherence to their beliefs is an all-or-nothing 
proposition, not a matter of compromise.263 It might not be any 
consolation for the employee opposed to working on Sundays to be 
offered part of the day off to attend church, or for an employee who is 
required to pray five times a day to be permitted to pray three times. Thus, 
it is not necessarily true that an employee would be worse off by receiving 
no accommodation than by receiving an unreasonable accommodation: In 
both instances the employee is being forced to violate his religion. 
Second, if raising the bar for reasonableness were to result in fewer 
accommodations, the fault would lie with how undue hardship, not 
reasonableness, is defined. The obvious solution would be to raise the 
undue hardship standard instead of lowering the reasonableness 
requirement. If this proposal were to result in fewer accommodations, 
perhaps this would generate the pressure necessary for Congress to finally 
pass the Workplace Religious Freedom Act or other legislation 
heightening the undue hardship standard. Third, in the absence of 
legislative action, courts could incentivize employers to offer employees 
the most effective accommodation they can without suffering undue 
hardship, even if the accommodation does not meet the new standard for 
reasonableness. Acceptance of such an accommodation by an employee 
would constitute waiver of any potential claim against the employer for 
failure to accommodate. The carrot of immunity could incentivize many 
employers to offer the best accommodation possible, thus allowing 
employees to choose for themselves whether some accommodation is 
better than none. 
One strength of this proposal is that it would benefit employees without 
any real cost to employers. As long as the undue hardship standard 
remains in place, employers would continue to be able to deny any 
 
263. See Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 55, 
86 (2006) (“Religious belief systems are rigid, all or nothing, frameworks. All religious obligations 
must be obeyed, and they can only be satisfied through literal compliance with the tenets of one’s 
faith.”). 
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accommodation that is even minimally burdensome. Thus, the net burden 
of accommodation on employers would remain virtually unchanged. 
Under this proposal, an employer might have to provide an 
accommodation that is different from the one it prefers. But because 
neither accommodation would impose more than a de minimis burden, the 
difference between what the employer prefers and what is required would 
be negligible.264 Moreover, any cost the employer would incur through 
this proposal would easily be offset by two benefits they would potentially 
reap because of it. First, employees accommodated in accordance with 
this proposal would be less likely to bring religious discrimination claims 
against their employers.265 Even if they did file suit, employers would be 
better positioned to defend themselves by showing they considered 
options for accommodation not only from their own perspective but also 
from the employee’s.266 And second, more employee-friendly 
accommodations would likely boost employee morale, leading to greater 
productivity, creativity, loyalty, and profitability.267 
 
264. In the case of the restaurant server who requests to be accommodated by transferring to the 
morning shift instead of the afternoon shift (so she could earn comparable wages), the employer would 
have to make this accommodation even though it prefers to move her to the afternoon shift, if 
transferring her to the afternoon shift would be unnecessarily disadvantageous to the employee. See 
supra section IV.C. But if placing the server on the morning shift instead of the afternoon shift would 
be even minimally burdensome to the employer, it would have no obligation to do so.  
265. See Marianne C. DelPo, Never on Sunday: Workplace Religious Freedom in the New 
Millennium, 51 ME. L. REV. 341, 357 (1999) (arguing that “the number of lawsuits will likely decrease 
as employers grow ever more accommodating of employee beliefs and practices”). 
266. See Flake, supra note 80, at 70 (arguing that employers that solicit an accommodation seeker’s 
input and give due consideration to the employee’s preferred accommodation will be better positioned 
to defend themselves in the event of litigation). 
267. See JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH 
IMPACT 2–4 (2019), https://askjan.org/publications/TopicDownloads.cfm?pubid=962628&action=d 
ownload&pubtype=pdf [https://perma.cc/5DP3-UBSV] (study of nearly 2,400 employers found that 
providing accommodations to disabled employees resulted in retention of valuable employees, 
improved productivity and morale, a reduction in workers’ compensation and training costs, and 
improved company diversity); DAVID BOWLES & CARY COOPER, EMPLOYEE MORALE: DRIVING 
PERFORMANCE IN CHALLENGING TIMES 9 (2009) (explaining that an employee’s perception of 
fairness and equity factors heavily into employee morale); Dallan F. Flake, Bearing Burdens: 
Religious Accommodations that Adversely Affect Coworker Morale, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 176–77 
(2015) (reviewing the literature on how high-morale workplaces enjoy stronger financial 
performance, greater productivity, better attendance, less stress, lower accident rates, and greater 
employee retention); Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Workplace Spirituality and Organizational 
Performance, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 355, 361–62 (2003) (concluding that spirituality in the workplace 
allows businesses to meet their profit-making goals by helping employees feel happier, more creative, 
and more connected to the work community); Fahri Karakas, Spirituality and Performance in 
Organizations: A Literature Review, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 89, 94–97 (2010) (“There is growing evidence 
in spirituality research that workplace spirituality programs result in positive individual level 
outcomes for employees such as increased joy, serenity, job satisfaction, and commitment. There is 
also evidence that these programs improve organizational productivity and reduce absenteeism and 
turnover.” (citations omitted)). 
Flake (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:14 PM 
2020] RESTORING REASONABLENESS 1723 
 
This proposal would also bring clarity to an area of law riddled with 
inconsistencies and contradictions. Confusion over whether 
reasonableness should be assessed from the employer’s or the employee’s 
perspective would be eliminated, as would questions about whether 
Title VII requires full or partial accommodation, or whether an 
accommodation can be reasonable even if it results in an adverse 
employment action. And while courts would have the added task in some 
cases of determining whether an accommodation unnecessarily 
disadvantages the employee’s employment, this inquiry would be limited 
to the relatively few cases where multiple accommodations are available. 
Even then, determining whether one accommodation would be more 
disadvantageous to the employee than another does not seem an especially 
difficult or time-consuming undertaking. 
Beyond these benefits, reconceptualizing reasonableness would be 
normatively consequential. Because law has both instrumental and 
symbolic value,268 “how it is implemented send[s] messages about who 
counts as equal members of the political community and what 
fundamental moral principles define that community.”269 In this case, 
Congress long ago made a value judgment that when possible, employees 
should be protected from having to choose between their jobs and their 
religious beliefs. While religious accommodation jurisprudence has 
stripped the law of much of its force,270 this conceptualization of 
reasonableness would go far in signaling that religious freedom remains a 
value worth protecting. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Title VII’s plain language—and equally clear legislative 
intent—that an employee is entitled to a reasonable religious 
accommodation in the absence of undue hardship to the employer, courts 
have whittled away at this right to the point it is practically nonexistent. 
 
268. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER 
IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993) (arguing that law has both instrumental 
and symbolic value); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 398 (1997) (“[L]aw also expresses normative principles and 
symbolizes societal values, and these moralizing features may affect behavior.”). 
269. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Legislatures Ignore Richard 
Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 79, 93 (2011). 
270. See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination 
Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 862 n.7 (2004) (observing that “Title VII’s religious accommodation 
requirement is generally viewed as fairly toothless”); J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1399–400 (2003) (“Unlike 
the toothless duty to accommodate employees’ religious practices that is contained in Title VII, [the 
ADA’s disability accommodation] provision has real bite.”).  
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Employees today have little say over if or how they are accommodated, 
as courts have made this almost exclusively the employer’s domain. To 
combat this trend and restore some semblance of balance, this Article 
proposes a reconceptualization of reasonableness that has the potential to 
strengthen the quality of religious accommodations for employees without 
unduly burdening employers in the process. Decoupling reasonableness 
from undue hardship would allow courts to assess an accommodation’s 
reasonableness from the employee’s point of view. No longer could an 
employer offer an accommodation without regard for how it might 
otherwise impact the employee’s employment. Instead, the employer 
would be required to provide an accommodations that fully eliminates the 
work-religion conflict, does not cause the employee to suffer an adverse 
employment action, and avoid unnecessarily disadvantaging the 
employee’s terms or conditions of employment. This would benefit 
employees by giving them access to accommodations that would enable 
them to perform their jobs without having to compromise their religious 
beliefs. Moreover, because an employer never has to provide a religious 
accommodation that would cause it more than a de minimis burden, this 
proposal would have virtually no adverse impact on employers. If 
anything, employers stand to benefit from it. With much to gain and little 
to lose, restoring reasonableness to workplace religious accommodations 
is a change worth making. 
 
 
